11th-12th December 2007: The 'U.S.-East Asian Relations: New Trends and Developments' conference was held in room 104 at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies

Session One, entitled 'The New Outlook of China-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Relations', was chaired by Shen Dingli, Professor & Director, Center for American Studies. Presentations were made by Robert Sutter, Professor in Asian Studies, Georgetown University, and by Liu Xuecheng, Senior Fellow, China Institute of International Studies.

Prof. Sutter focused his presentation on the long-standing asymmetry of the relationship, and suggested that this asymmetry was unlikely to radically change in the near future. Sutter gave three main reasons for this: the preoccupation of the three nation’s leaderships with other matters; that fact that there are presently few incentives for change; and the likelihood that forces outside the control of the countries would be most likely to affect change.

Prof. Sutter pointed out that although the U.S.-Japan relationship has encountered some problems recently, such as the differing stance toward North Korea, the long-term resilience of the partnership is notable. Furthermore, the recent rise of China has provided an added incentive for both the U.S. and Japan to nurture this relationship.

On the other hand, according to Prof. Sutter the China-Japan relationship is characterized by a dynamic in which the differences are very strong, but currently held in check by common interests. Since these differences have mostly not yet been addressed by either side, Prof. Sutter says that “the foundation is full of differences”, and therefore “features could emerge that the leaderships can’t control”.

Prof. Liu characterized the past 60 years of China and Japan’s relations, as a period of “winter”, but suggested that the past few years may have seen the start of a period of “spring”, as evidenced by events like the appointment of Abe as Japan’s prime minister, and the recent visit of a 450 member Japanese delegation to China.

Meanwhile, Prof. Liu outlined his vision of the U.S.-China relationship as potentially shaping the Asia, and the world, of the 21st Century, quoting Hu Jintao’s recent comment in Washington D.C. that the two powers had the opportunity to become “constructive partners”.

Nonetheless, Prof. Liu suggested that although all three sides have made efforts to avoid power confrontation, they are all also preparing for confrontation, should their national interests be threatened. In this respect, Liu said that “the United States regards Japan as Asia’s Britain”, and characterized the U.S.-Japan relationship as “the predominant force in shaping the regional strategic arrangement”.

Lowell Dittmer, Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, commentating on the presentations, suggested that the Japan-China side of the triangle was currently the weakest. For example, Japanese trade with India now exceeds that with China, and political relations have been tested in recent years by rhetoric from both sides.

Following the main discussion, other delegates offered their opinions regarding the session’s key themes. Wu Xinbo, Professor & Deputy Director, Center for American Studies, said that the rise of China, and it’s willingness to “become a more responsible stateholder” in the east Asia region also makes it a more important part of the triangle.

Victor Cha, Director of Asian Studies, Georgetown University, suggested that the United States would retain the pivot role in the triangle for the foreseeable future, though hinted that rhetoric on China in the upcoming American presidential would be the most notable concern.

Alex Lennon, Editor-in-chief, The Washington Quarterly, questioned whether a possible future “unhooking” of Japan from American influence would be a welcome or threatening development in the eyes of China.

Mike Green, Associate Professor of International Relations, Georgetown University, emphasized the importance of the three-way relationship’s stability for the wider Asia-Pacific region, while Eric Altbach, Vice President, Economic and Trade Affairs, National Bureau of Asian Research, pointed out that certain strategic aspects of the trilateral relationship haven’t yet caught up with concurrent economic advances.

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'East Asian Integration and the U.S.', the theme of Session Two, was addressed in presentations by Amy Searight, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and Prof. Wu Xinbo. Ni Shixiong, Professor at the CAS, chaired the session.

Prof. Searight outlined what she characterised as the current three prevalent views in the U.S. of East Asian integration. First, “What’s all the fuss”, in which the U.S. doesn’t fear exclusion because it is too important, and because Asian regionalism has not yet amounted to much. Second, “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em”, in which it is potentially too dangerous for the U.S. to be left outside the important regional dynamic. Third, “Build it and they will come”, in which areas of clear overlapping interest are identified and used as the basis for a framework with concrete objectives. Prof. Searight saw the latter as the consensus view. Possible future developments in this direction could be the revitalizing of APEC, the development of parallel U.S. strategy, and regional Asia-Pacific agreements on climate and clean development.

Prof. Searight predicted that Japan would play a key role, but said its divided interests would be critical. She contrasted Japan’s desire for independent leadership from the U.S., especially financially, with its strong interest in maintaining U.S. involvement, especially in terms of geopolitical balance with China. The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is also crucial: “if Congress refuses to ratify the agreement it will cause regional problems, but if it ratifies the agreement this will put the U.S. right back into the center” of the region.

Prof. Wu started his presentation by questioning whether the region is developing towards “exclusive blocs” or “inclusive agreements”, and the extent to which the U.S. would be “involved in the architecture.”

The U.S. needs to understand that “there is growing consensus and enthusiasm” in Asia, Wu said, but it shouldn’t be too concerned about East Asian integration, since it is not the only affected party. As China becomes more active, it will become more reliant on other Asian countries, and therefore will also need to become more involved with Asia. Wu said that both parties, especially the U.S., should be “encouraged to play a constructive role in East Asian affairs” for shared benefits.

APEC could be revitalized by joint efforts from both sides of the Pacific, Prof. Wu said. If the U.S. chooses not to disengage from the region it would remain indispensable, especially in an economic and strategic role, and could use dialogue with other APEC members as a direct channel for expressing its concerns about East Asian integration.

Ren Xiao, Professor & Deputy Director, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, commentating on the presentations, was more pessimistic about the role of APEC. Its original economic role has been diluted by new agendas like security and terrorism and “APEC has now to a large extent lost its mission”.

Zhai Kun, Director, Southeast Asian and the Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, pointed out that the U.S. is traditionally the leader of organizations it is involved in. This would be an important question in relation to its involvement in APEC.

Catherine D’Alpino, Visiting Associate Professor and Director, Thai Studies Program, Asian Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, suggested that the U.S. might not join the East Asian Summit as this could trigger the involvement of Russia, not necessarily a welcome development in the face of deteriorating U.S.-Russia relations.

Pan Rui, Professor at the CAS, pointed out that Japan’s loss of economic hegemony in the region has changed the structural Asian framework. Additionally, China has reached the stage where it can play an active part in international agreements, further changing the balance of power in the region.

Mike Green reminded that currently only 20% of money made in Asia is invested in Asia, with most going to the U.S. and Europe, and emphasised the need for better Asian capital markets.

In summarizing the session, Wu Xinbo said that “the U.S. is still part of the equation, and we should keep it in mind when we talk about the future”.

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Session Three, 'New Landscape in U.S.-East Asian Economic Relations', featured presentations by Eric Altbach and Pan Rui, and was chaired by Chen Zhimin, Professor & Chair, Department of International Politics, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University.

Prof. Zhimin outlined in his presentation how U.S. status in East Asia was continuing to grow. Concurrently, China is rising one by one in the ranks of East Asian economies. The East Asian economies are now the largest holders of U.S. currency. Furthermore, economic cooperation between East Asian economies has been growing steadily for the past two decades.

His comments were picked up by Eric Altbach who said that, although Asian growth has consistently exceeded the global average in the past two decades (except during the financial crisis), “Asian countries particularly prefer to invest in Europe and the U.S.”, rather that in Asia, and thus “Asia is inexplicably linked to global financial networks.” Furthermore, the G7, one of the key mechanisms managing macro-economic imbalances, does not contain many of the key Asian economies, like China. This may drive future regional cooperations.

U.S. involvement in these regional agreements, said Altbach, could include the championing of institutions tying the U.S. and Asian economies.  Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), such as that with Singapore, and those currently being negotiated with Malaysia and South Korea, were also part of this framework. The latter he described as “part of our broader effort to support economic reform and liberalization thoughout the broader area”.

Pan Rui said that since most East Asian countries made use of international growth to for means of national growth, trade agreements were essential for maintaining their growth. The ASEAN+3 summit was the most significant move towards establishing a regional framework, but the U.S. is still Asia’s most important trading partner and it’s exclusion from negotiations would be “almost impossible”. Indeed, Prof. Pan suggested that American support of APEC, and opposition of an East Asian Economic Agreement, signalled its need for agreements that consider American interests.

Song Guoyou, Lecturer at the CAS, detailed the declining U.S. economic role in East Asia. In 1999, the U.S. accounted for 14% of South Korean and 19% of Singaporean exports. As of 2007 the figures had respectively declined to 11% and 10.4%. Dr. Song used this point to suggest that rather than relying on FTAs to cement its role in the region, the U.S. would require some kind of multilateral system.

Robert Sutter pointed out the flip side of this argument: as half of China’s trade is in processing, and the U.S. is the major recipient of this trade, the interests of the two countries are inextricably linked.

Liu Ming, Senior Fellow & Deputy Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, described China’s current attempts to secure its own FTAs with countries like Australia as a possible riposte to America’s endeavors, adding that “whether it’s positive for the future of regional development remains to be seen.”

Wu Xinbo raised the possibility that China or Japan would exchange their large reserves of U.S. dollars for Euros if the dollar continued its current decline, and pointed out that this would have an effect on both the economics and politics of the wider region.

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Session Four addressed the theme of 'U.S.-Southeast Asian Relations: Changes and Continuity'. The session featured presentations by Catherine D’Alpino and Zhai Kun, and the chair was Zhu Mingquan, Professor at the CAS.

Prof. D’Alpino described the recent wax and wan of South East Asia in the imagination of the U.S. as being due to three factors: the war on terror; the formation of ASEAN; China’s changing role in the region. She said that historically the U.S. has not treated ASEAN as a group of nations, and that bilateral negotiations are still the key to U.S. policy. The U.S. policy toward Burma is an example: the U.S. has pressed individual countries, “first Japan, then Thailand, then China, then India”, to pressure Burma regarding democracy and human rights, and largely avoided the channel of ASEAN.

U.S. relations with various South East Asian states – including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – have recently undergone marked improvement, said Prof. D’Alpino, but the hot issue in Washington is now China’s involvement in the region. There are possibilities for cooperation, of which Prof. D’Alpino suggested that energy cooperation and maritime security could initially be the most fruitful, although they are “also the ones that offer the potential for the most competition between the U.S. and China”.

Prof. D’Alpino added that, in the U.S., “very few presidential candidates have anything to say about South East Asia except for Burma, and that’s revealing”.

Prof. Zhai suggested that a stronger ASEAN might be a good solution for both the U.S. and China in this region, since it would be “a good platform for balance of power”: Chinese power would be balanced in the ASEAN+3 platform and, furthermore, ASEAN+6 would balance Japanese power. The new ASEAN order could run in parallel, or as a challenge to, the American-oriented hub and spoke order, but Prof. Zhai believed both systems could peacefully coexist.

However, the ASEAN charter passed this year is looser than the EU’s, and Prof. Zhai said the resulting reduced sense of identity was an issue that would need to be surmounted, as would that of leadership. Currently Singapore has a commanding role, but shared leadership could be a more realistic future option. Indeed, Prof. Zhai added that ASEAN itself “must show opinion and common sense, otherwise they will lose leadership”.

Mike Green agreed with Prof. D’Alpino that historically the U.S. is reluctant to encourage institutions that it is not involved in. Nevertheless, he said, “it’s in everyone’s interests to have as strong an ASEAN as possible”, since it could be “a good stabilizing mechanism” for U.S.-China competition. Furthermore, collective initiatives like an ASEAN navy could help reduce the possibility of a new regional arms race, as states like India and Japan may be more welcoming of ASEAN patrols and maneuvers than those of national navies like the PLA.   

Ren Xiao outlined some of the limitations involved in cooperation. For example, although China has successfully brokered a meeting between the U.S. and Burma in Beijing, it is still very difficult to force the Burmese government to do anything. Certain issues like health and pandemics would be easier to collectively manage than others like piracy, he said.

Robert Sutter suggested that the various different approaches to climate change within the ASEAN framework could be a cause of conlict.

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Session Five, focusing on the 'DPRK Nuclear Issue, Six-Party Talks and Northeast Asian Security' was chaired by Xin Qiang, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Center for American Studies. Liu Ming and Victor Cha both made presentations on the session’s theme.

Prof. Cha outlined four major features of the American perspective towards negotiations with North Korea. First, he emphasized U.S. commitment to a peaceful diplomatic solution, before outlining how the approach must be a multilateral one, with special emphasis on cooperation with China. Prof. Cha described the approach as a long-term one, following a process first initiated in 1994, and one in which disablement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities was “still the goal and purpose of the six-party talks”.

Prof. Liu said that the priority of the United States is to keep momentum in moving towards a North Korean declaration. He suggested that the key issue with regards to any declaration would be the disclosure of certain technologies and materials, including 52-4 kg of weapons grade plutonium. However, Prof. Liu outlined some uncertainties in the process, including North Korea’s wish for “a tangible road-map before they will allow nuclear material to be removed from the territory”, and the difficulties involved with next year’s U.S. presidential election.

Shen Dingli, commentating on the presentations, suggested that although he was convinced of the United States’ peaceful intentions – especially after the war in Iraq – he was “puzzled and concerned” at America’s concurrent bilateral negotiations with North Korea, separate from the six-party talks. “Without proper debriefing”, he said, “China could feel excluded, and this could hinder its enthusiasm”. Prof. Shen emphasized that the U.S. must also be clear about its definition of North Korean denuclearization, as if it allows civilian nuclear energy projects, this could provoke the suspicion of China.

Other participants offered a wide range of comments. Mike Green, backing up Prof. Shen’s comments, warned that North Korea might perceive its Yongbyon nuclear facility “as a card worth trading to escape from significant coercion and pressure”, rather than a step towards total denuclearization. Pan Zhengqiang, Major General (ret.), China National Defense University, said that “the fact that the nuclear crisis developed to such an extent was largely the making of the United States.” Amy Searight suggested that a parallel track to the six-party talks might be opened “where there are clear, common problems to be solved”. Steven J. Smith, Captain, U.S. Air Force; Olmsted Scholar, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, pointed out that, even in the result of successful North Korean denuclearization, wider-scale issues would still need addressing in the Korean peninsula.

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The title of Session Six, 'U.S. Multilateral Security Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific and Their Implications for Regional Security', was the focus of presentations by Mike Green and Pan Zhengqiang, in a discussion chaired by Wu Xinbo.

Prof. Green suggested that at present no actor in the region wants “a single clean, clear architecture,” due to the various different alliances and relations between them. He outlined how uncertainties about the intentions of China and the U.S., and of the future of the Korean peninsula, have led to a lack of consensus about what the purpose, membership requirements, etc. of any regional institution should be.

Indeed, Prof. Green emphasised that Asian alliances would not constitute a bloc in any case, because “there are numerous different agreements in the area, for example the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement”. U.S, policy is also based around a system of myriad agreements and relations, which ensure that “the agenda is almost always about another place in the Pacific”, and not directly about China. However, since this “agenda” is about shaping the movement of Asia, China is necessarily part of the dialogue and outcome and therefore, Green said, “it’s an open door, depending on how China wants to define its role.”

Gen. Pan started his presentation with the observation that the Asia-Pacific region’s divergence in terms of history, self-perception and national priorities necessarily makes a multilateral approach to security the long-term ambition for the region. However, multilateralism must involve all the major players in the region, as in the six-party talks, which Pan characterised as an arrangement in which “countries can work together to solve issues, not necessarily at the expense of others”.

Gen. Pan said that in order to achieve this harmony of interests the U.S. and China must accept one another’s role in the region. The key question would be what mechanism to use, and he suggested that talks based around specific issues, like energy cooperation or maritime security, could be a good strategy. Gen. Pan described the key challenges to successful cooperation in the region as the overcoming of deep-rooted suspicion between the U.S. and China, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and issues of reunification in the region involving the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. He also warned against ideological interference in such processes, adding that “common goals” and “mutual respect” were of vital importance.

Xia Liping, Senior Fellow, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, commenting on the presentations, suggested that the current model of competition (“two tigers”) should be replaced by one of cooperation (“two houses”). He described the current U.S. approach as contradictory. On the one hand, the U.S. wants to cooperate with China on matters like the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, and the threat of terrorism, but on the other it continues to make military preparations towards China. Xia said that if both sides make military preparations, it could lead to a security dilemma in the region. However, neither would it be in China’s interests for the U.S. to leave Asia, especially if it created the possibility of Japan becoming a nuclear power.

Robert Sutter noted that high profile multilateral cooperation already exists to an extent in the military arena, as shown by exercises like Valiant Shield. Chen Zhimin suggested that there had been a change in attitude towards multilateralism in both China and the U.S. in recent years, with the former more active and the latter more reluctant than before. Wang Yiwei, Associate Professor at the CAS, reminded of the importance of the financial markets in relation to this theme.

Eric Altbach questioned whether those countries that are not direct participants in any wider framework could maintain confidence in those processes. His concern was reinforced by Ou Boqian, Councilor, Chinese Foreign Ministry; Visiting Fellow, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, who doubted that a North Asian Forum could function without the interaction of North Korea.

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Session Seven, titled 'Prospects for U.S.-East Asian Relations by 2015', was chaired by Pan Zhenqiang and featured presentations by Alex Lennon, and Wang Jianwei, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point.

Prof. Lennon focused his presentation on what he perceived as the five most likely major issues of 2015: Japan’s development as a ‘normal’ nation; the rise of India; the Taiwan issue; Chinese demography; whether Korea is still divided.

He then outlined the four major global security threats as being proliferation, terrorism, climate change, and Sino-Indian relations, suggesting that the first two were closely linked to what President Bush has classified as the “nexus of danger”.

Prof. Lennon said that he expected the two major principles of strategy in 2015 to be the cooperation of great powers, and the continued promotion of democratic values by the United States. The current situation in North Korea was described as a “test case”, as if negotiations fail to make a breakthrough before next year’s change of American president, Prof. Lennon said that the potential to deal with other issues, like the Iranian nuclear project, would be diminished.

Prof. Jianwei lamented the past few years “involuntary neglect” of U.S.-East Asian relations, due to preoccupations elsewhere. He outlined how Taiwan’s upcoming UN referendum could cause a crisis in the Taiwan strait, contrasting the perceived U.S. view that it is too late to do anything with China’s determination to enforce its anti-secession law.

By 2015, according to historical cycles, Prof. Wang thought America may have entered a period of contraction, and this could have implications for the east Asia situation. Additionally, Prof. Wang was concerned about the lack of foreign policy specialists in the current Chinese leadership which, if unaddressed before 2015, could also have negative expression in the outlook of the fifth generation of Chinese leadership.

Both presenters mentioned the ambivalent view of each country towards the other. Prof. Lennon noted the lingering suspicion of China that continues to shape U.S. policy, and suggested that “responsible statehood” would be “vital in undermining those who are suspicious of China’s motives”. Prof. Wang said that the U.S. view that China is attempting to form institutions to exclude the U.S. in Asia was a hindrance to the strengthening of this relationship. Furthermore, America’s reluctance to be involved with, and declining of observer status in, the East Asia Summit was potentially damaging to its standing in this region.

Commenting on these presentations, Wang Yiwei pointed out the lack of an economic angle. This region contains the world’s three largest economies. China and Japan are the major holders of U.S. currency. America and Japan are the major investors in China. Therefore, Wang argued that as “there is already economic dependence, why is there not yet a concurrent security framework?”

Wu Xinbo predicted that east Asia would continue to integrate and become less reliant upon the U.S. security role as America’s economy declined. Robert Sutter opposed this view, saying that “the decline of the United States is premised on Asian integration” but that the attendant issues hindering integration “have yet to be resolved”. Sutter argued that the U.S. annually spends U.S. 50-100 billion on maintaining Asian security, and this was unlikely to be matched by an Asian country in 2015.

Shen Dingli suggested that China’s increased military spending would change the Asian security dynamic by 2015. Assuming current levels of economic growth and military spending, China will be spending upward of USD 100 billion by 2015, he said, and this would be manifested in a changed Chinese view toward Japan, and increased confidence in regards to the Taiwan issue.

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In summarizing the events of the two days, both the Chinese and American sides agreed that it had been a most fruitful period of discussion, offering great mutual benefit and opportunity. Prof. Shen expressed his hope that the event would become an annual occurrence. Prof. Sutter agreed, and hoped that a party from Fudan would be able to visit Washington in the near future.