Executive Summary
The United States-China relationship continues to evolve. Both countries are debating the nature of relations with the other, but no firm conclusions are possible as they try to assess and manage highly dynamic and potentially unstable change, both internally and externally. The sixth round of the annual U.S.-China workshop that was sponsored this year by the Pacific Forum CSIS, the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, and the CNA Corporation studied the forces at work on the relationship and focused on ways to build and maintain positive relations between the two countries.
The dominant view in the U.S. is that China is rising and the U.S. must work with that country. At the same time, however, there is unease about the economic impact of that rise, Beijing’s economic policies, and a military modernization program that seems disproportionate to threats; these fears are exacerbated by a lack of transparency regarding Chinese capabilities and intentions. China’s relations with “rogue regimes” also generate concern. President Bush is trying to contain these pressures and work with Beijing to build a positive and constructive relationship. Significantly, there’s a growing sense that the U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship for the U.S.
From a Chinese perspective, the relationship is stable, but complicated. Chinese insist the core issue is how the U.S. will view China’s rise. They argue that China’s U.S. policy will be determined by the U.S. debate. They insist Washington should accommodate a rising China, but China must learn to become a responsible state and fulfill its international obligations. Americans counter that China must acknowledge and take responsibility for its behavior. Beijing cannot suggest it is a passive player in that process or in its relationship with the U.S. Its behavior and actions shape the U.S. debate and U.S. responses to China.
In this environment, trust is paramount. Despite the positive rhetoric, distrust is high and mutual confidence is a precious commodity. Chinese still fear the U.S. is attempting to block its rise or will contain China once it has risen; Americans fear China aims to supplant it as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific. Neither is reassured by the other’s assurances that those fears are ungrounded. Opening a senior-level dialogue is a good step, but progress rather than posturing is needed to develop the relationship.
The military dimension is a perplexing element of the relationship. China is the only country that the U.S. has a normal relationship with, yet both militaries also engage in planning, games, and exercises aimed at the other. And this is despite growing mil-mil relations. Beijing’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force in the event of a declaration of independence by Taiwan means that the possibility of conflict between the U.S. and China remains very real. Taiwan focuses Chinese military modernization on the need to deter the U.S., and the capabilities needed to prevail in a cross-Strait conflict could be used to protect Chinese interests elsewhere in the region.
Chinese are more confident when it comes to cross-Strait relations: they feel the situation has changed fundamentally in their favor. They warn that U.S. policy toward Taiwan will be read as a signal of U.S. intentions. For China, the task now is keeping cross-Strait relations moving in their current direction and maintaining existing momentum. While the U.S. is pleased with the new optimism, Americans argue the failure of the Chinese government to reach out to Chen Shui-bian and the Taiwan government (and not just to opposition leaders) is a mistake.
Seeming progress in the Six-Party Talks has helped the U.S.-China relationship, although there are questions about China’s role in the negotiations. Chinese insist Beijing has not been a passive presence in the negotiating process – as some Americans allege – and has worked to push all parties toward a solution. Americans remain skeptical.
Views are divided on East Asian integration. The process will be difficult but Chinese argue progress will benefit the entire region and the U.S. Therefore, Washington should support community-building efforts. The U.S. is not worried about the East Asian Summit, mostly because it is unclear what the summit is or its purpose. The U.S. remains in a wait-and-see mode, and is closely watching Beijing’s behavior. All agree that East Asian integration is a good idea, but much depends on how it’s put into practice.
Existing cooperation on counterterrorism, North Korea, and Taiwan provides a foundation for building stronger relations. Persistent strategic mistrust will continue to be a concern: transparency is good, but hedging will continue. The two countries must work harder to manage China’s rise and Americans called on Chinese leaders to better understand other countries’ concerns and to do more to ease them.
There is a need for a new vision for the U.S.-China relationship. The description of the relationship as “candid, constructive, cooperative – and complicated” is no longer sufficient. Chinese participants suggested the two countries start using the word “partnership.” This requires a better understanding of the goals the two countries wish to achieve, the burdens they share, and how responsibilities will be apportioned. And that requires a far more direct and honest dialogue than has been the case thus far. China must explain how it will use its power as it rises. Americans will demand that the relationship be more than process and produce substantive results. It will look for Beijing to provide positive contributions to issues of mutual concern, consistent with international norms.
China and the U.S. are struggling to define their relationship as China undergoes an unprecedented transition. The U.S. is prepared to accept China’s rise – it has no choice – but it seeks to ensure that the China that emerges will be a good global citizen, will not challenge the existing order, and will work with the U.S. to ensure that both nations’ interests – and those of the entire world – are protected and advanced. Both nations are uncertain about how they will relate to each other as their relationship intensifies and becomes more complex.
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U.S.-China Workshop:
Searching for a New Vision
Conference Report
The United States-China relationship continues to evolve. Both countries are debating the nature of relations with the other, but no firm conclusions are possible when both countries are trying to cope with stresses in domestic politics brought about by a changing international environment and the interaction of the domestic and external events. In other words, leaders in both countries are trying to assess and manage highly dynamic and potentially unstable change, both internally and externally.
There are many uncertainties and many variables. The scale of the two countries and their impact on the region and the world complicate and make understanding more difficult. At a time of immense change, how do we evaluate short-term trends and developments? There is a growing sense that time horizons are too short. Both countries need to focus on long-term trends, but that raises equally unanswerable questions. How do we define intentions? How, in short, do we achieve the mutual understanding and build the mutual trust that is essential not only to the relationship between these two countries, but to the region and the world as a whole?
The experts and former officials who have joined the U.S.-China workshop sponsored by the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, the CNA Corporation in Washington, and the Pacific Forum CSIS understand the importance of the bilateral relationship and are committed to building and maintaining positive relations between the two countries. This year, some 40 experts and officials met for the sixth round of this annual dialogue in Honolulu. The report that follows represents the views of the rapporteur; it is not a consensus document; it seeks to present the main themes articulated at the conference.
The year in review
Charles Morrison, of the East-West Center, began our discussion with an assessment of developments since our meeting last year in Shanghai. The dominant view in the United States, Morrison noted, is that China is rising and the U.S. must work with that country. At the same time, however, the U.S. is conflicted: there is unease about the economic impact of China’s rise and Beijing’s seeming pursuit of predatory economic policies. There are worries about a military modernization program that seems disproportionate to the threats in the strategic environment; these fears are exacerbated by a lack of transparency regarding Chinese intentions.
Domestic politics contributes to the friction. Iraq is the foremost preoccupation of U.S. policy makers, depriving other issues of attention and resources. Frustrations created by the situation in Iraq tempt politicians to lash out at other problems: China is a convenient scapegoat. A growing sense that President Bush is a lame duck and the beginning of jockeying for the 2008 presidential campaign also put China policy in play.
President Bush is trying to contain these pressures and work with Beijing to build a positive and constructive relationship. Significantly, noted Morrison, there’s a growing sense that the U.S.-China relationship is the most important relationship for the U.S. No regional questions can be answered without taking into consideration China’s views or without dealing with Beijing.
Ni Shixong, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, provided a Chinese perspective on the relationship. It was, interestingly, brighter than that given by Chinese participants at our meeting last year. Overall, he considers the relationship to be relatively stable, but quite complicated. Cooperation remains the main trend, but there’s increasing realism on both sides. Ni describes the last year as “one of the best periods since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1979.” He credits “the three maintenances” for this. They are: the maintenance of frequent high-level contacts between the two countries (phone calls, visits, and meetings); the maintenance of strategic dialogue between them (the decision to establish a senior-level dialogue is an especially good sign); and the maintenance of strong momentum for Sino-U.S. cooperation.
Of course, obstacles and problems persist. He identified four: human rights, trade and economic issues (including trade deficits, the revaluation of China’s currency, protection of intellectual property rights, textile tariffs, China’s market economy status, and hostility to the purchases of U.S. companies by Chinese corporations), the Korean nuclear crisis, and Taiwan. The latter two are especially tricky. Signs of progress in negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs have helped ease the tension between Washington and Beijing that has been created by this issue. The momentum regarding Taiwan appears to have shifted, with the mainland now holding the upper hand in this contentious relationship. (Both subjects are taken up in more detail below.)
For China, the core issue is how the United States will view China’s rise. According to Ni, “The nitty gritty of China’s rise is: China’s rise is inevitable; China’s inevitable rise is peaceful. China will rise in peace, by peace, and for peace.” The perception of China’s rise will determine U.S. policy, and China’s U.S. policy, Ni warned, will be determined by the United States. It is promising, then, that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said the U.S. welcomes a peaceful, prosperous, and stable China. The U.S., Ni argues, should accommodate a rising China. At the same time, China must learn to become a more responsible state and fulfill its international obligations.
Our discussion focused on the proper characterization of the relationship. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s description of relations as “the best ever” made many Chinese uncomfortable. They are much happier saying that it is increasingly complicated and complex, with growing interaction on virtually every level. As one Chinese participant put it, “there are growing pains and growing gains.”
Increased interaction, however, does not necessarily make understanding easier. Observers have different objects to focus on, and that focus often determines the conclusions reached. From an economic perspective, the relationship is largely positive; a political perspective tend to focus on the negative. Chinese stress at every opportunity that China’s rise will be peaceful but Americans counter that is beside the point: the question is what happens when China has risen. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s call for the removal of all foreign bases in Central Asia is considered a troubling indication of Chinese intentions. An American participant said Beijing’s readiness to extend every diplomatic courtesy to “rogue regimes” such as Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, Sudan, and others says much about China’s respect for international law and the norms that govern international society. Beijing’s readiness to embrace these unsavory regimes suggests that the use of Chinese power may not be as principled as its leaders have intimated.
The most important point, as one American participant noted, is that China must acknowledge and take responsibility for its behavior. China has growing power, regional concerns, and global interests. Beijing seeks to have its status recognized by the rest of the world. There must be a better understanding in both capitals of what China’s rise and what China’s demand for recognition of its rise mean in practical terms. Beijing cannot continue to suggest it is just a passive player in that process or in its relationship with the U.S. It must understand that its behavior and actions shape the U.S. debate and U.S. responses to China. Chinese participants countered that their leadership’s attention likely will be focused on domestic concerns and the huge internal challenges the country faces as it continues to develop.
In this environment, trust is paramount. It is quite plain that despite the positive rhetoric, distrust is high and mutual confidence is a precious commodity. Chinese still fear the U.S. is attempting to block its rise or will contain China once it has risen; Chinese participants pointed to Secretary Rice’s March speech at Japan’s Sophia University – which enumerated a list of nations whose relations with the U.S are improving, all of them on China’s periphery – as proof of U.S. intentions. The U.S. response that a containment policy would look very different from current U.S. policy has little impact. Americans fear China aims to supplant it as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific. Chinese dismiss this fear as groundless.
A Chinese participant called on the two countries to “foster similarities, decrease differences, and avoid confrontation.” Another said the U.S. must learn to accommodate a rising China while China learns to accommodate a hegemonic United States. He explained that in practical terms means China will continue to oppose hegemonism, but it will not challenge the U.S. role; China will oppose interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states but will at the same time welcome a constructive security role for the U.S. While that appears to provide a theoretical foundation for a productive relationship, one American participant asked if China could be a constructive partner for the U.S. as long as it adheres to a doctrine of strict noninterference in domestic affairs.
Security relations and military-to-military dialogue
The military component is one of the most perplexing elements of the China-U.S. relationship. Michael McDevitt, director of the Center for Strategic Studies at CNA Corp., argued the relationship is unique because China is the only country that the U.S. has a normal relationship with, yet both militaries engage in contingency planning, war games, and exercises aimed at the other. The source of this paradox is Taiwan – not Taiwan per se, but the possibility of a conflict over Taiwan. Beijing’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force in the event of a declaration of independence by Taiwan means that the possibility of conflict between the United States and China remains very real.
McDevitt argued that Taiwan creates another dynamic in the relationship: it focuses Chinese military modernization on the need to deter the U.S., and the capabilities needed to prevail in a cross-Strait conflict could also be used to protect Chinese interests elsewhere in the region. As a result, the U.S. military must factor China into its planning both short- and long-term. This creates an action-reaction dynamic, heightens mistrust, and builds tension into the bilateral relationship.
McDevitt provided an overview of China’s December 2004 Defense White Paper. He calls it an important document that reflects increasing sophistication and confidence on the part of the Chinese military. It shows that China shares the U.S. view that the global war on terrorism will be long and demanding and success requires dealing with the root causes of terrorism. It underlines troubling concerns, such as the structure of the global order, a growing competition for resources, and the increasing importance of national military power. According to the document, the Chinese military is giving increasing importance to the air force, navy, and the second artillery in a bid to strengthen capabilities that would allow it to control the sea and air, a clear signal of China’s intent to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The white paper makes plain that China will “resolutely crush at any cost” a declaration of independence by Taiwan, regardless of the impact on the region.
In assessing the 2005 Department of Defense report on the People’s Liberation Army, McDevitt noted that criticism by both the Chinese government and U.S. neo-cons implies that the report was generally balanced. It raised basic questions, such as why China is building up its military at such a rapid pace, especially when it risks upsetting the military balance in the Pacific and alarming its neighbors. It decried the lack of transparency on the part of Chinese military planners. While the report is a warning, McDevitt noted that even in two decades, China’s GDP – and hence the economic resources it can marshal on behalf of the nation – will be a little over one-quarter of those available to the U.S.
He described the senior-level dialogue recently initiated with Beijing as an effort to better integrate China into international institutions and to develop ways for the two countries to work together in the pursuit of common interests. He warned that the desire (or necessity) to work with China does not mean that the U.S. will not hedge against a possible downturn in relations, however.
Guo Xinning, of China’s Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, applauded the smooth development of military relations over the past 4-5 years. The two countries have adopted a comprehensive security agenda and are tackling a wide range of issues of global and regional significance. Military to military relations include exchanges, visits by Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Defense University delegations, and visits by ranking military officials.
Nevertheless, Guo (like others) highlighted the deep-rooted mutual suspicion and lack of confidence. He bemoaned the mixed signals the U.S. sends and called on both sides to maintain the momentum in efforts to build trust and confidence. He said that U.S. policy toward Taiwan will be read as a signal of U.S. intentions. He argued that transparency at the strategic level is more important that at the tactical; seemingly, confidence is built at the top and it trickles down to other layers of the relationship.
There is a paradox at the heart of U.S.-China relations: the mood is optimistic, but mistrust is profound, particularly among the two militaries. The decision to open a senior-level dialogue is taken as a good sign by both sides, but it is unclear whether the dialogue will result in progress or mere posturing. One U.S. participant warned that China’s ability to respond to U.S. demands for action will determine the success of this dialogue. If China seeks to use this mechanism to avoid dealing with certain problems, such as Taiwan, then it will harm rather than help the bilateral relationship.
On a military level, the need for confidence building measures is plain. Yet Chinese concerns about increased transparency mean that the process of building CBMs must be evolutionary, slow, and proceed at a pace at which both parties are comfortable. They should start in nonsensitive areas, such as a strategic dialogue among institutions or by promoting exchanges among educational institutions and universities.
Two other relationships came up in this discussion. Chinese expressed concern about the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security relationship as made plain in the Feb. 19, 2005 joint declaration by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC). Chinese worry that a revitalized U.S.-Japan security alliance and a larger role for Japan in security matters in the region is ultimately intended to contain China. Americans struggled to reassure Chinese counterparts that the SCC statement is the culmination of a planning process that began over a decade ago and is a response to a changed security environment rather than a China threat. Moreover, one counseled, Chinese should be aware that their behavior contributed to Japan’s desire to seek closer security cooperation with the U.S.
For their part, Chinese insisted that closer China-Russia military relations, exemplified by Peace Mission 2005, a week-long exercise between the two militaries that occurred as we met, should not concern the United States or others. It was a natural outgrowth of the 1997 Russia-China strategic partnership and was merely one in a series of counter-terrorism exercises the two countries have joined. Chinese called on Washington to open a dialogue with China to discuss joint military exercises between the two countries.
Cross-Strait challenges
It was in our discussion of relations between the mainland and Taiwan that the change in the Chinese mood was most evident. Most Chinese feel that the situation has changed fundamentally since we last met. Concerns that Taiwan leader Chen Shui-bian would make progress toward independence have diminished substantially. Visits by three opposition leaders to the mainland have convinced the Chinese leadership and observers of the cross-Strait relationship that the momentum has shifted and Beijing is ascendant.
Ding Xinghao, of the Shanghai Institute for American Studies, laid out the factors influencing Chinese perceptions of the cross-Strait relationship. He highlighted the visits of the opposition leaders, saying that “the protracted political confrontation has been broken, which indicates that the cross-Strait relationship has entered a new stage.” A new atmosphere has been created for the two sides to engage in dialogue and he sees the election of Ma Yang-jeou, the mayor of Taipei, as chairman of the opposition KMT as proof of a new attitude in Taipei. Rising economic interaction, and Taiwan’s growing dependence on the mainland for its economic growth, contribute to the new mood.
The United States, argues Ding, is empowered by the existing triangular relationship. It has leverage in Beijing and Taipei as both look to Washington to influence the other partner. Significantly, China now acknowledges the U.S. can be a positive force in cross-Strait relations.
All three parties believe the cross-Strait status quo should be maintained, although each defines the status quo differently. Each government must work to see that these differences do not lead to miscalculations and missteps. Dialogue between China and the U.S. is one way to ensure mistakes do not occur, said Ding.
Denny Roy, of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, provided a U.S. perspective on cross-Strait relations. He agreed that the momentum has shifted following the December 2004 Legislative Yuan elections and visits by Taiwanese opposition leaders to the mainland. Chinese confidence has been bolstered by passage of the Anti-Secession Law and rising economic interdependence between the two sides of the Strait. Nevertheless, the political standoff between Beijing and Chen continues. The failure of the two militaries to adopt CBMs is troubling, but the truth is the PLA has little interest in reassuring Taiwan; intimidation is the message it wishes to send.
A Chinese participant explained that Beijing’s priorities have shifted in the last year. In 2004, China wanted to prevent Chen from taking steps that would destabilize the relationship. Today, the task is keeping cross-Strait relations moving in their current direction and maintaining the existing momentum. An American countered that while the U.S. is pleased with the new optimism, the failure of the Chinese government to reach out to Chen is a mistake. Moreover, the Chinese must understand that a new president in Taipei will not bring about reunification: there is no constituency for that in Taiwan today.
Another Chinese participant explained Beijing was not unrealistic. It understands that a quick breakthrough is impossible; instead its goal is to realize stability across the Strait. That allows China to concentrate on economic development, its overriding priority. China has reached out to Chen’s party, the Democratic Progressive Party. Mayors and legislators have been invited to visit China, but Chen blocked them, alleged our Chinese colleagues. An American participant encouraged the Chinese to be patient: geography favors the mainland. Taiwan will always be in China’s shadow and time is on the PRC’s side. Another U.S. participant noted that electoral reforms in Taiwan are also having an effect and are likely to moderate Taiwanese politics.
Americans tried to end speculation that the U.S. favors a continuing division of Taiwan and the mainland. The U.S. is committed to a peaceful resolution of the situation. At the same time, however, any solution must reflect the will of the Taiwanese people. Until then, the U.S. remains prepared to defend Taiwan. But that does not mean the U.S. favors division for its own sake. In fact, argued one American participant, tensions in the Taiwan Strait are “a bleeding sore” that is counter to U.S. interests. It is a flashpoint and an impediment to better relations with China.
While the U.S. will work with China on this and other issues, Americans insisted that dialogue with the U.S. is no substitute for dialogue with the elected authorities of Taiwan. The U.S. will work to encourage a cross-Strait conversation, but it will not work with China against Taiwan.
Korean Peninsula challenges
Our fourth session focused on challenges on the Korean Peninsula. Scott Snyder, of the Pacific Forum CSIS and the Asia Foundation, began with an assessment of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, which began at the end of July and recessed just before we met. Snyder believes significant changes were evident in the latest round. The U.S. has adopted a new approach and appears more flexible and ready to make a deal. North Korea’s readiness to negotiate was a change in itself. And China and South Korea have both played more aggressive supporting roles to facilitate a dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.
In Snyder’s view, China is playing the role of facilitator, not that of broker or mediator. As drafter of the joint statement that was to be issued at the end of the talks – and hopefully will still be issued when they resume – Beijing’s basic approach was to split the difference between Washington and Pyongyang. Snyder asked whether this role kept Beijing from expressing its own view and whether this is consistent with the basic principles of the Six-Party Talks. After all, all six parties are partners in the talks and each has its own interests to represent. That was one of the reasons the U.S. embraced a multilateral format: it hoped to mobilize all affected countries to see that their interests called for the denuclearization of North Korea and to pressure Pyongyang to act. Equally important, Snyder said it is unclear whether China considers a nuclear North Korea to be inherently destabilizing.
The fourth round also witnessed the emergence of South Korea as a more active player in the dialogue. This new role was made possible by North Korea’s Dear Leader Kim Jong-il: by meeting South Korean Minister of National Unification Chung Dong-young when he was visiting Pyongyang, Kim provided a stamp of approval on South Korea’s role as go-between. Snyder believes that is also a good outcome since it gives Seoul some responsibility for the outcome of the Six-Party Talks.
Snyder believes that the prospects for the fourth round of talks are good. A joint statement appears to be within reach, and it will provide the foundations and guiding principles for continuing negotiations and an eventual settlement. He cautioned, however, that reaching an agreement is only the beginning of the process and implementation of any deal remains problematic.
Tao Wenzhao, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, echoed Snyder’s overall assessment of the talks. He agreed that the atmosphere has improved, that face-to-face talks between North Korea and the U.S. were a good sign, that both parties appeared more patient and were less provocative, and that there was agreement on a common goal – the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by peaceful means. Nevertheless, differences remain. Denuclearization means very different things to Pyongyang and Washington. The sequencing of any deal is going to be a diplomatic headache. The overall goal of normalizing relations between the two long-time bitter adversaries faces substantial political obstacles in both capitals.
Looking ahead, the chances of progress are good if the parties stick to the six-party framework, maintain the spirit of mutual respect, and keep patient. Tao anticipated that any deal would require North Korea to return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which would give it the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Normalized relations between Washington and North Korea would be possible as long as North Korea truly denuclearizes.
Finally, Tao explained that China has not been a passive presence in the negotiating process. Beijing has its views about desired outcomes and has not refrained from expressing them, although it does so quietly. He added that a successful resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis would encourage the six-party framework to evolve into a regional security mechanism.
Discussion focused on two issues. The first was China’s role in the talks; the second was what North Korea truly expects to get from the negotiations. Chinese participants argued that China’s role has evolved. Originally, Beijing was just a host and not a direct participant. As the negotiations evolved, China developed its own stake in the process and became a broker. China has made its views clear to all parties, including North Korea, but it is done so quietly. It was suggested that the evolution in Chinese thinking is part of a broader evolution and learning process of the new Chinese leadership.
Americans agreed that the U.S. is more pleased with the Chinese role than in the past, but there are still questions about Beijing’s willingness to use its leverage to nudge North Korea back to negotiations. There also remain differences between U.S. and Chinese assessments of North Korean technical capabilities and the existence of the uranium enrichment program.
Determining what North Korea wants from the talks is guesswork at best. Most fundamentally, it is unclear whether North Korea has made a strategic decision to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Is the leadership in Pyongyang truly prepared to bargain over the terms of its dismantlement of its nuclear program or is it merely stalling for time? North Korean demands that Japan be removed from the talks, that the U.S. end its presence on the Korean Peninsula, and that Washington remove all its nuclear weapons from the region, suggest Pyongyang may not be serious.
One American participant provided a more optimistic assessment, however. He noted that a few weeks ago North Korea demanded to be treated like Pakistan, as a nuclear-weapons power; now it was merely asking for the right to maintain a peaceful nuclear energy capability. That is progress.
Managing East Asian integration
Our fifth session focused on the process of building in East Asian community and the dynamics of integration. Wu Xinbo, of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, highlighted the growing interest in East Asian integration after the 1997 financial crisis. Growing intra-regional trade, increasing recognition of the need to tackle regional problems as a group, and the example set by Western Europe and North America have prodded Asian nations toward greater cooperation. It won’t be easy. Deteriorating relations between China and Japan, the region’s two largest powers, are a formidable obstacle to regional integration. The U.S. position in regard to East Asian integration is equally important. If the U.S. fears that integration might undermine its influence and interests in the region, it might work to undermine the process.
Ralph Cossa of the Pacific Forum CSIS provided a U.S. perspective on this process. He noted that the Bush administration, despite its reputation, has been more supportive of East Asian multilateralism than many of its predecessors. Washington is not yet worried about the East Asian Summit (scheduled to be held in December), mostly because it is unclear what the East Asian Summit is or its purpose. More time has been spent debating who will attend the meeting than what it will do. Given the tensions in Northeast Asia, and the deteriorating relations between Japan and its neighbors, it’s difficult to get too worked up about its prospects. Cossa did note, however, that while the U.S. remained in a wait-and-see mode, it would be closely watching Beijing’s behavior. Will China attempt to integrate Taiwan into the new regional order? Will China attempt to exclude the U.S. from this regional order?
It is clear that there are far more questions that answers about the process of East Asian integration. All agree that it is a good idea, but much depends on how it’s put into practice. How will various Asian and Asia-Pacific institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC),and the East Asia Summit interact? What will be the division of labor among them? How will Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region relate to each other? The answers to these questions may well determine the success of efforts to more deeply integrate the region. Unfortunately, those answers are anything but clear.
It is curious that the region appears to be embarking on another attempt at integration when efforts to date have been so frustrating. There appears to be declining interest in APEC as regional governments pursue free trade agreements. Attempts to promote a more active security agenda at the ARF have been stymied. One U.S. participant cautioned against taking an overly pessimistic view of regional efforts thus far. He argued that while grand visions have been flagging, a great deal of work has been done “down in the weeds,” where capacity building has been enhanced and discreet efforts are creating a slowly thickening web of regional standards.
Several questions dominated our discussions. The first was the resulting U.S. role as Asia integrated. How would the evolving Asian institutional architecture deal with the bilateral U.S. security alliances? Would the alliances become irrelevant as Asia coalesced into a larger political entity? How – and where – will security matters be discussed? Again, Chinese assured Americans that regional integration did not seek to exclude the United States from the region. Several called on the U.S. to take a more positive approach to the East Asian Summit. One Chinese noted that the U.S. killed the East Asian Economic Caucus and the Asian Monetary Fund. It should be more open-minded toward East Asian attempts to integrate. A U.S. participant noted that the development of the Chinese market and the creation of substantial domestic demand in China would shift global economic patterns and diminish U.S. influence in the region. This portends a more fundamental shift in U.S. fortunes, but U.S. policymakers don’t seem to be preparing for it.
Here, the Taiwan issue surfaced again. Americans worry that the process of integration will further marginalize Taipei. The Chinese counter that Taiwan is already being integrated into China and therefore would be part of any East Asian community. An institutionalized relationship, however, will be difficult without the three links. The fault for that, argued a Chinese participant, lies in Taipei.
Building a stable future
The positive assessment of U.S.-China relations creates a burden on policy-makers: they should act now to exploit opportunities and build a stronger, more stable relationship for the future. Existing cooperation on counterterrorism, North Korea, and Taiwan provides a foundation upon which the two countries can build. Bonnie Glaser, of the Pacific Forum CSIS, outlined the key challenges the two countries face. Topping her list is the need to ease persisting strategic mistrust, a point that is obvious to anyone reading this report or who attended the conference. She added that transparency is good, but warned that hedging will continue. The two countries must work harder to manage China’s rise. Although both have a role to play, Beijing’s burden is heavier. Glaser called on Chinese leaders to better understand other countries’ concerns and to do more to ease them. They cannot merely dismiss talk of a China threat without responding to the fears that motivate such talk.
She also suggested the two countries make energy a cooperative issue in their relationship, rather than a source of competition. The two countries can work together on renewable energies, conservation, energy efficiency, clean energy technologies, experimental energy resources, and coordination among the world’s leading energy consumers. They should expand military exchanges and dialogues. And the two governments must continue to manage their differences over Taiwan. A multiplicity of mechanisms exist to deal with these questions. The challenge for both governments is using them effectively. This process will help build confidence between the two countries, diminish mistrust, and provide a foundation for ongoing efforts on these and other issue areas.
Sun Zhe, also of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, agreed that strategic suspicion overshadows the relationship. Both countries see the other as a rival and possible military opponent. Nevertheless, both governments recognize that they have far more to gain from cooperation than from competing and they have worked to maximize gains from the bilateral relationship. This is part of China’s increasingly cooperative attitude toward the world more generally; Beijing strives to become a more normal member of the international community and seeks acceptance of that role by its diplomatic partners.
Sun believes that China will continue on its current course, focusing on economic development and trying to create the political conditions for continuing growth. China needs more economic reform to eliminate growing disparities within the country, to take care of its rapidly aging population, and to overcome shortages of energy and other vital natural resources that threaten its future. The process of political reform will be difficult as political leaders strive to balance calls for change with their own political imperatives. All the while, China’s growing power will – as it already has –unnerve other nations. Beijing must do more to assuage those concerns. Sun recommended greater people to people contacts as one possible aid in this effort.
Our discussion underscored the need to develop a new vision for the U.S.-China relationship. The description of the relationship as “candid, constructive, cooperative – and complicated” is no longer sufficient. Chinese participants suggested the two countries start using the word “partnership.” It is important to take steps toward the institutionalized management of bilateral relations, which would help insulate the relationship from attempts by interest groups to hijack the bilateral agenda. Yet as U.S. participants reiterated, this requires a better understanding of the goals the two countries wish to achieve, the burdens they share, and how responsibilities will be apportioned. This requires a far more direct and honest dialogue than has been the case thus far.
The summit meeting between President Hu Jintao and President Bush in Washington in early September was one opportunity to move this process forward. While it has been postponed, the eventual meeting – now scheduled to take place later in September – will still facilitate communication and push relations to another level. When asked what to expect from the meeting, Chinese participants suggested that President Hu will look for President Bush to repeat that he does not support Taiwan independence, that the U.S. opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, and that he will encourage cross-Strait interaction. The Chinese will seek pledges that the U.S. will not take unilateral action against China on economic issues, and Hu would like more military-to-military initiatives. He is likely to also express his concern about the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance and press for greater cooperation to keep the Six-Party Talks on track. Hu is also likely to look for assurances that the relationship between the two countries is indeed strategic, whether it is a partnership or not.
Americans will look for President Hu to explain how China will use its power as it rises. The U.S. will look for assurances that Chinese rhetoric is more than just words. Americans will demand that the relationship be more than process and produce substantive results. It will look for Beijing to provide positive contributions to issues of mutual concern, consistent with international norms.
China and the United States are struggling to define their relationship as China undergoes an unprecedented transition. The U.S. is prepared to accept China’s rise – it has no choice – but it seeks to ensure that the China that emerges will be a good global citizen, will not challenge the existing order, and will work with the U.S. to ensure that both nations’ interests – and those of the entire world – are protected and advanced. In sum, both nations are uncertain about how they will relate to each other as their relationship intensifies and becomes more complex.
As usual, our meeting provided more questions than answers. No one argued that the relationship was in serious trouble. But, as Pacific Forum President Ralph Cossa concluded, if Sino-U.S. relations were a “7” last year, most seemed to see them as a “6.5” or worse today: still better than average but with a slightly downward curve, leaving lots of room for improvement. The opportunities for cooperation are many, but so too is the potential for greater disagreement or confrontation, not just over the “standard” issues – Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, human rights/democracy, economic/trade issues – but in a growing number of international areas where Chinese and U.S. political and diplomatic interests and objectives could just as easily coincide, coexist, or conflict, depending on how much each side recognized and accommodated the other’s interests and concerns; a “complex” relationship, indeed.
