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The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance

Washington Quarterly, Winter 2005-06, pp.119–130.

PDF file: http://twq.com/06winter/docs/06winter_wuxinbo.pdf

Enhanced security ties between Washington and Tokyo since the
mid-1990s, particularly during the past few years, have transformed the
U.S.-Japanese alliance and reshaped the East Asian security environment.
Although external threats to Japan today are at a historic low, the transformation
has created room for Tokyo to pursue a more active and aggressive
security policy. From dispatching troops to Iraq to listing Taiwan as one of
the “common strategic objectives” between the United States and Japan in
the Asia-Pacific region, Japan has shown increased assertiveness and willingness
to work militarily with the United States. Impressed by Japan’s enthusiasm
and dynamism in promoting security cooperation, U.S. deputy
secretary of state Richard Armitage, an enthusiastic proponent of strong
U.S.-Japanese security ties, remarked satisfactorily on the achievements in
the U.S.-Japanese alliance at the end of the first Bush administration: “[I]f
you look back to where we were in 2000 and where we are now, oh, so many
things have changed. So many things.”1 Yet, as the United States and Japan
have expanded their security ties to reflect changes in their respective threat
perceptions and regional security strategies, strong concern has arisen in
other countries.
This is particularly true in Beijing, which believes that enhanced security
cooperation between Washington and Tokyo compromises China’s security
interests. For years, many Chinese analysts regarded the U.S.-Japanese alliance
as a useful constraint on Japan’s remilitarization. Developments since
the mid-1990s and especially during the past few years, however, have convinced
them that the alliance has become an excuse for Japan to pursue a
more active security policy. Moreover, the “China factor” has played an
even stronger role in U.S.-Japanese security cooperation under the Bush administration
than in previous years. Concern with checking rising Chinese
power and deterring a possible Chinese use of force in the Taiwan Strait has
caused Washington to push for more assertive Japanese security policy, shaping
both the form and substance of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Indeed,
as Beijing continues to expand its material power and influence in
Asia, Washington has sought to balance China’s rise through its campaign
to return Japan to a “normal nation.” Contrary to past policies, the United
States is now driving rather than constraining Japan’s rearmament. In the
foreseeable future, short of a major adjustment of U.S. regional security
strategy, the U.S.-Japanese alliance will act as a propellant of, rather than as
a cap on, Japan’s military development. At least as far as China is concerned,
the bright side of the U.S.-Japanese alliance seems to be gone.

From Protégé to Partner:Redefining the U.S.-Japanese Alliance since the 1990s

The U.S.-Japanese alliance has come a long way, even since the mid-1990s
when the Clinton administration redefined Washington’s security ties with
Tokyo. Revisions of the U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines in 1996 and 1997
transformed the former Cold War security arrangement from an instrument
to protect Japan against external threat into one designed to cope with contingencies
on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, as well as for
balancing against a rising China. Japan’s role in the alliance expanded significantly
as Tokyo moved from protégé to partner. Efforts to strengthen the
alliance also reduced the possibility that Japan would pursue a security
policy independent of the United States. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration
exercised some caution by not overtly advocating that Japan revise
its constitution and remove the ban placed by Article 9 on its rights of collective
defense, which stands at the core of the “Peace Constitution” imposed
by the United States after World War II. The scope of U.S.-Japanese
security cooperation was focused on the Asia-Pacific region, defining the
alliance’s parameters as regional rather than global. Finally, although the
Clinton administration worked hard to strengthen security ties with Japan,
it also made efforts, particularly in its second term, to engage China to develop
a “constructive strategic partnership.” Such efforts helped reduce Chinese
suspicion of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and, to some extent, redressed
the imbalance in relations among the three major players in the region.
The Bush administration is a vociferous proponent of U.S. security ties
with Japan and has consequently brought the U.S.-Japanese alliance to a
stage unimaginable in prior years. Its blueprint for upgrading the U.S.-Japa-
nese alliance can be found in the so-called Armitage Report, which argued
that the revised guidelines for U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation “should be
regarded as the floor—not the ceiling—for an expanded Japanese role in the
transpacific alliance.” It also called for revising the Japanese constitution
and legitimizing the right of collective defense, suggesting that “Japan’s prohibition
against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation.”
2 Marking a major break from past U.S.
policy, the report set the U.S.-British relationship
as the model for U.S.-Japanese ties.
Aspiring to turn Japan into the United Kingdom
of the Far East, the report suggested a
wide range of elements aimed at strengthening
U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation and transforming
the alliance.3
With many of the participants of the Armitage
Report, such as Michael Green, James Kelly,
Torkel Patterson, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Armitage himself, joining the
Bush administration, the United States worked assiduously to strengthen
and upgrade its security ties with Japan following the blueprint outlined in
the report. In June 2001, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and
Pacific affairs James Kelly stated in congressional testimony that, “over the
next few years, we hope to build with Japan an enhanced strategic dialogue
encompassing both economic and security issues, a dialogue built on the
foundation of the wide range of beliefs and perspectives we share with Japan,
and which taps the full potential of our alliance relationship.”4 The
U.S. National Security Strategy released in September 2002 reiterated the
Bush administration’s position that it will “look to Japan to continue forging
a leading role in regional and global affairs.”5
Since the September 11 attacks, Washington has been endeavoring to
globalize the alliance, urging Tokyo to assist the United States in the war in
Afghanistan and in the reconstruction of Iraq. Military cooperation has
been substantially deepened between U.S. and Japanese forces, particularly
with Japan deciding to join the United States in deploying a theater missile
defense system, the operation of which will require the integration of U.S.
and Japanese command, control, and communication systems. Furthermore,
under the U.S. plan to realign its global military bases, Japan will serve as a
key stronghold in the Asia-Pacific region, hosting the headquarters of U.S.
ground, air, and naval forces in the region. Moreover, the Bush administration
has openly urged Japan to revise its Peace Constitution and remove the
ban on its rights of collective defense, suggesting explicitly that such a
change would be a prerequisite to Japan obtaining a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council.6

As a result of the Bush administration’s efforts and the activism demonstrated
by Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, the U.S.-Japanese alliance
has been remarkably upgraded and bilateral security cooperation
greatly strengthened during the first Bush administration. As Vice President
Dick Cheney noted in early 2004, “Today, our alliance is far more than a bilateral
security pact. It is a global partnership dedicated to promoting our
common vision, solving problems, and meeting challenges wherever they
may arise.”7 Armitage did not want to hide his satisfaction while commenting
on the progress in U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. He said, “I think
that we have accomplished the goals of the Armitage Report. … I’m very
excited about what’s been accomplished over four years.”8 Some U.S. observers
note that Washington’s attitude toward Japan has shifted from “Japan
bashing” and “Japan passing” to “Japan surpassing,” suggesting that
Tokyo’s actions on security cooperation with the United States have gone
beyond Washington’s expectations.9

Chinese Concerns over an Upgraded U.S.-Japanese Alliance

Such heightened security cooperation and a strengthened U.S.-Japanese alliance,
however, has raised a number of concerns in Beijing, particularly
about their implications for Japanese politics, its China policy, Tokyo’s military
development, and regional stability as a whole, particularly in the Taiwan


The unprecedented attention that the Bush administration has paid to the
U.S.-Japanese alliance coincided with and underpinned a conservative trend
in Japanese politics which, in recent years, led to Tokyo’s adoption of a
tougher China policy, a deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations, and in the
spring of 2005 widespread anti-Japanese protests in China. Although many
individual issues, such as entanglements about the history of Japanese aggression
in World War II, competing claims to the Diaoyu islands, oil and
gas rights in the East China Sea, and Japan’s growing involvement in the
Taiwan issue, have contributed to increased tensions in bilateral relations,
the crux of the problem lies in Japan’s evolving domestic politics and its
strategic thinking about China. Japan’s domestic politics have become increasingly
conservative, a trend that has culminated in the Koizumi administration.
Hailed as “neo-conservatism” in Japan, this political current has
two important manifestations. The first is an effort to whitewash Japan’s history
of aggression during World War II. The second is an attempt to turn Ja-
pan into a “normal country,” jettisoning the post–World War II limitations
imposed on its security policy.
Under these circumstances, the history issue has become a major source
of contention between China and Japan. Japanese conservatives complain
that China keeps pushing Japan to apologize for its aggressive past. Yet, although
Japan has never apologized in a meaningful way for the atrocities
committed in China during the 1930s and 1940s, in reality the Chinese care
less about who delivers an apology or what exactly is said and more about
Japan’s handling of issues related to that unfortunate part of history. They
are angered and concerned by the relentless
attempts by right-wingers in Japan to smooth
over the country’s past atrocities, particularly
in its history textbooks; the lack of responsible
measures on the part of the Japanese
government to reimburse Chinese “comfort
women” and forced laborers who suffered
badly at the hands of Japanese militarists; and
inadequate action by Japan to address the issue
of chemical weapons abandoned by its
military in China at the end of World War II.
Koizumi has also been paying tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine, where Class A
Japanese war criminals from World War II are enshrined, every year since he
came to power in 2001. Such actions, controversial even among Japanese,
humiliate and infuriate the Chinese. Indeed, Koizumi’s uncompromising
attitude is what has brought Japan’s political relations with China to a
deadlock. Japan’s actions on all these issues, affected partly by its unique
cultural tradition and partly by its rising political conservatism, only fuel the
Chinese belief that Japan is fundamentally incapable of behaving as a responsible
power and achieving genuine reconciliation with its neighbors.
As the U.S.-Japanese alliance has strengthened, Japan has embraced the
idea that a rising China is a strategic rival. In December 2004, Japan’s new
National Defense Program Guidelines named China as a possible threat to
its national security for the first time.10 Beyond discussions of the North Korean
threat, the guidelines turned to China, expressing strong concern over
China’s modernization of nuclear and missile capabilities as well as its naval
and air forces and the expansion of its area of operation at sea. The new
guidelines, which set out Japan’s defense policies for the next decade, suggested
that Japan should be attentive to China’s future course. Prior to this,
Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force developed a defense plan to prepare for a
possible Chinese attack.11 Furthermore, in February 2005 the U.S.-Japan
Security Consultative Committee released a joint statement laying out a set
of common strategic goals for the alliance. Noteworthy was its inclusion of
China-related issues, including Taiwan. Although the wording was subtle,
the fact that Japan and the United States officially recognized confronting
these issues as one of their common strategic goals suggests that China will
increasingly drive security cooperation between Tokyo and Washington and
underscores Japan’s increased focus on China as a priority concern on its national
security agenda.


From Tokyo’s and Washington’s perspectives, Japan’s return to normalcy
means greater military might and a more active and assertive security policy.
Beijing, however, is very concerned with the orientation of Japan’s security
policy, viewing it as one of the key factors affecting stability in Northeast
Asia as well as China’s security environment.12 Given Japan’s well-equipped
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and particularly its advanced naval and air
forces, Japan is already a major military power in Asia. Moreover, its military
strength continues to grow as Tokyo seeks to develop its power projection,
intelligence collection, and ballistic missile capabilities. The Chinese also
wonder whether Japan will continue to lower the threshold for its overseas
military activities. In the late 1990s, the revised U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines
and the Laws Regarding Contingencies in the Surrounding Areas of Japan
made it possible for Japanese troops to be involved in a conflict outside
of Japanese territory.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Koizumi promulgated the “Special
Law for Dealing with Terrorism,” which, although confining the role of
the SDF to noncombat zones and to providing logistical support, lowered
the threshold for dispatching Japanese forces overseas.13 As the United
States launched the Iraq war, Koizumi’s government moved to draft a law on
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for Iraq, under which Tokyo dispatched
three SDF services. This was the first time since World War II that
Japan has sent its troops overseas for reconstruction and humanitarian aid
purposes not mandated by the UN. These steps have greatly undermined the
spirit of Japan’s current constitution as embodied by Article 9, which forbids
the deployment of Japanese forces abroad. Furthermore, the Koizumi government,
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and other Japanese conservative
forces, encouraged by what they have accomplished in the past decade
and spurred on by the Bush administration, are now aiming to revise the
Peace Constitution and amend Article 9 in particular, thus removing Japan’s
last obstacle to freely exercising its military muscle.14
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has come a long way to becoming a
major military player. It maintains one of the most modernized armies in the
world and continues to expand its military capability. Since 1992, it has enacted
21 major pieces of security-related legislation—nine in 2004 alone—
legitimizing and legalizing sending military forces abroad. Japan is drifting
away from pacifism, driven partly by its evolving domestic politics and partly
by the United States. As one U.S. expert on Japan noted, “Since the end of
the Cold War in 1991 and particularly under the administration of George
W. Bush, the United States has been doing
everything in its power to encourage and even
accelerate Japanese rearmament. Such a development
promotes hostility between China
and Japan, the two superpowers of East Asia.”15
This has given rise to strong Chinese concern
over U.S. strategic intentions toward China,
as well as the mission of the U.S.-Japanese alliance
in today’s security environment.


Of Beijing’s various concerns about the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the most
acute is the potential impact on China’s handling of the Taiwan issue. Unfortunately,
the strengthened U.S.-Japanese alliance has led to Japan’s accelerated
involvement in the Taiwan issue, as demonstrated by the February
2005 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee joint statement, which in
turn has further harmed Sino-Japanese relations. The widespread anti-Japanese
protests in China in the spring of 2005 were aroused not only by historical
and territorial disputes but also by Japan’s unwarranted interference
in what China perceives as its core national interests in the Taiwan issue.
To Washington and Tokyo, the alliance will serve first and foremost as a
formidable deterrent against Beijing’s possible use of force against Taiwan.
Should deterrence fail, their alliance would serve as a platform for a joint
U.S.-Japanese response to a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. In 1996 and
1997, when the United States and Japan worked to revise their defense cooperation
guidelines, they included the Taiwan Strait in the parameters.
Even though Tokyo insisted that the parameters are situational rather than
geographical, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula have been listed
by Tokyo and Washington as the two potential hot spots necessitating U.S.-
Japanese security cooperation in East Asia. Since the defense cooperation
guidelines were revised, both U.S.-Taiwanese and Japanese-Taiwanese security
ties have been remarkably enhanced. Given the long-held U.S. security
commitment to Taiwan, the expansion of U.S.-Taiwanese military relations
may be expected. The growth of Japanese-Taiwanese security ties, however,
should be attributed to the expanded mission of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

In fact, interaction between Washington and Tokyo on the Taiwan issue has
been increasing, with Tokyo more actively consulting and coordinating with
Washington in its relations with Taipei. After listing Taiwan as a common
strategic objective in February 2005, Japan and the United States are reported
to be working on a joint war plan for the Taiwan Strait.16 As the
U.S.-Japanese alliance assumes the function of security guarantor to Taiwan,
it serves to embolden the separatist forces in Taiwan, who believe that, no
matter which side provoked a war in the Taiwan Strait, Washington and Tokyo
would be ready to come to their rescue. Based on this calculus, Taiwan
has been pushing for the creation of a “U.S.-Japan-Taiwan security coalition”
in recent years.17 For Beijing, the hard reality is that, if the situation in
Taiwan spins out of control and requires force, it has to be prepared to deal
not only with the United States but also with a militarily more active and
capable Japan.


Chinese analysts believe that it has been a key U.S. policy objective to maintain
primacy in regional security since the Cold War years. To that end,
Washington not only retains a strong forward deployment but also a vibrant
“hub-and-spoke” alliance system, of which the U.S.-Japanese alliance is the
core. In the post–Cold War era, Japan has become an even more valuable
piece of the U.S. regional security strategy: it helps consolidate U.S. preponderance
and balance China’s growing power. As Japan becomes more actively
involved in the U.S. regional security strategy, enhanced U.S.-Japanese
security ties will contribute to the primary U.S. strategic position in East
Asia and the western Pacific region, amplifying U.S. clout on regional political,
economic, and security affairs. As the alliance also intends to serve as
the backbone of a regional security structure, the emphasis placed on it reflects
an attempt to enhance the U.S.-Japanese condominium of regional security,
a development that will both undermine China’s influence in the
region and run the risk of returning the region to a bipolar structure characterized
by strategic competition, antagonism, and even confrontation. A bipolar
regional order would be a nightmare scenario, at least for China and
presumably for the entire region, including the United States and Japan.
From a Chinese perspective, the evolving political, security, and economic
trends in East Asia call for the creation of a new security arrangement
—a security community that will meet the region’s needs, ranging from
fighting terrorism to curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to
protecting the sea lanes of communication. Because today’s security challenges
differ greatly from those of the Cold War era, the approaches must as
well. Such a security community should be pluralistic and based on several
pillars, including a concert of major powers (the United States, China, Japan,
and Russia); ad hoc coalitions on specific issues, such as the six-party
talks on the North Korean nuclear issue; existing security alliances, such as
the U.S.-Japanese alliance; and regional or subregional mechanisms, such as
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).18 Creating this type of security community
in the Asia-Pacific region is possible
because states in the region have shared interests
in peace and stability. It is also feasible because
countries are increasingly aware of the
necessity to work together to confront today’s
security challenges, and habits of security cooperation
are being developed region-wide.
Hopefully, the budding mechanisms for regional
security, such as ARF and even the six-party
talks, will evolve into more effective instruments
to promote regional cooperation.
It is worth noting that far-sighted U.S. strategists have also realized the
necessity of security community-building in the region. Dennis C. Blair,
former commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, observed in 2001
that, although the United States has long approached security relations in
Asia as a hub-and-spoke arrangement, “the question now is how the United
States will develop and implement security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific
region to handle the challenges of the twenty-first century.” In his opinion,
it is preferable to promote “security communities” in which states cooperate
in areas of shared interest such as peaceful development, diplomacy promotion,
and the use of negotiation to resolve disagreements.19 To some extent,
the Bush administration’s overemphasis on the U.S.-Japanese alliance has
gotten away from this approach.

Tough Choices Ahead

It is unrealistic, given its concerns, to assume that China will openly embrace
the U.S.-Japanese security alliance as a durable institution for regional
security. Yet, this is not to say that China cannot tolerate or learn to live
with it. To a large extent, Beijing’s perception and attitude depends largely
on the alliance’s mandate concerning China, as well as the state of trilateral
relations among Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington.
Although the U.S. political elite generally agree on the desirability of expanding
U.S.-Japanese security ties, two different schools of thought exist in
the United States regarding the function of the alliance vis-à-vis China.
One suggests that the alliance should play an instrumental role in develop-
ing a security arrangement among the United States, Japan, and China. As
former deputy assistant secretary of defense Kurt Campbell noted, “It is hard
to imagine a continuing future of peace and stability in Asia unless these
three powers can negotiate a kind of strategic modus operandi.”20 Some in
this camp argue that the broader goal of the alliance “is to integrate China
and Russia into a regional security order without
sacrificing the security of Japan, South Korea,
and the United States.”21 No matter what
the ultimate formula of the security calculus
looks like, this line of thinking seeks to use the
alliance to engage and integrate China. The
other school emphasizes constraining and containing
China. Believing that a rising China is
doomed to be the United States’ “strategic
competitor” and the Taiwan Strait to be the
place where the United States could become enmeshed in a major war in
Asia, adherents of this school argue that a strengthened U.S.-Japanese alliance,
including an expanded Japanese role, will best serve the purpose of
containing a stronger China and deterring China on the Taiwan issue.22
If the alliance opts for engagement and integration, Beijing will likely be
willing to live with it and even work with it on certain issues of common interest.
For example, the United States and Japan can seek to work with
China to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and ensure
the safety of the sea lines of communication in the western Pacific region.
Even on the Taiwan issue, the U.S.-Japanese alliance can play a constructive
role. In the fall of 2003, for example, when Taiwanese leader Chen Shuibian
pushed for a plebiscite on cross-strait relations in the election campaign
and sharply raised tensions in the Taiwan Strait, both Washington and
Tokyo urged Chen not to push too far. In the end, the pressure from Beijing,
Washington, and Tokyo helped keep Chen at bay.
If the alliance chooses constraint, deterrence, and even containment,
however, China will naturally view it as a major security threat and will endeavor
to counterbalance it. Efforts to promote a more active Japanese military
posture in order to balance a rising China and to accelerate U.S.-Japanese
involvement in the Taiwan issue are all indicative of this approach. Current
Chinese efforts to strengthen military cooperation with Russia, including
the first joint military exercise between the two countries, held in August
2005, are a reflection of its growing concern over the U.S.-Japanese alliance.
The state of U.S.-Chinese-Japanese trilateral relations also informs
Beijing’s perceptions of and attitude toward the alliance. If China has normal
relations with the United States as well as Japan and trilateral relations
are largely stable, Beijing will be less suspicious of a Washington-Tokyo axis,
as it will believe that both the United States and Japan value the importance
of the trilateral framework to manage regional affairs and to promote
their respective national interests. Under these conditions, the U.S.-Japanese
alliance and the trilateral framework are more likely to be complementary
than competitive. Yet, if trilateral relations are not stable and assume a
posture of two (the United States and Japan) against one (China), Beijing
will feel that the alliance mainly serves as a platform through which Washington
and Tokyo will work against China rather than alongside it. Currently,
despite various problems, Sino-U.S. relations are largely stable, while
Sino-Japanese relations are at a historic low. Trilateral relations are consequently
neither balanced nor sound, only increasing Beijing’s suspicion of
the U.S.-Japanese alliance.
Japan’s desire to become a “normal” country, to walk out of the shadow of
being an aggressor and a loser in World War II, is understandable. Japan’s
normalcy, however, does not necessarily require building a more powerful
military machine, assuming a more assertive military posture, or taking a rising
China as its arch enemy. That Washington attaches great importance to
the U.S.-Japanese alliance as its key security investment in the region since
the Cold War years is also understandable. Yet, strong U.S.-Japanese security
ties should not come at the expense of stable U.S.-Chinese-Japanese trilateral
relations. Indeed, as China’s material power and influence grows, it
will play an even more important role in regional affairs. In the end, sound
trilateral relations among Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington will best serve regional peace and prosperity.


1. Bureau of International Information Programs (BIIP), U.S. Department of State,
“U.S.-Japan Relationship Continues to Grow in Importance,” Washington File,
December 2, 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfileenglish&
2. See Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University, “The
United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report,
October 11, 2000, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR_01/SR_Japan.htm.
3. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
4. James Kelly, “U.S. Policy in East Asia and the Pacific: Challenges and Priorities,”
testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee
on East Asia and the Pacific, June 12, 2001, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/
5. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.
26, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
6. Asahi Shimbun, July 23, 2004 (quoting J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels,
“Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan,” Policy Studies 19,
2005: 61, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PS019.pdf).
7. Office of the Vice President, The White House, “Remarks by the Vice President at
the Washington Post-Yomiuri Shimbun Symposium,” Tokyo, April 13, 2004, http://
8. BIIP, “U.S.-Japan Relationship Continues to Grow in Importance.”
9. Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan
Become the Great Britain of Asia?” Pacific Forum CSIS: Issues & Insights 5, no.
3 (March 2005), http://www.csis.org/pacfor/issues/v05n03_pdf.pdf.
10. “National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After,” December 10, 2004,
11. “GSDF Defense Plan Prepares for Attacks From China,” Asahi Shimbun, September
27, 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200509270137.html.
12. See Yang Yi, “The Orientation of Japan, the DPRK Nuclear Crisis, and the Taiwan
Issue: Three Major Factors Affecting Security in Northeast Asia,” World Affairs
(Beijing), no. 4 (2004): 20–21.
13. Yoshio Murakami, “Recent Japanese-American Relations” (paper presented to workshop
on “America’s Role in Asia, Northeast Asia,” Seoul, February 23–25, 2004), p. 6.
14. Boyd and Samuels, “Nine Lives?” p. 48; Linda Sieg, “Push to Revise Japan Pacifist
Constitution Growing,” Reuters, September 14, 2005.
15. Chalmers Johnson, “The Real ‘China Threat,’” Asia Times Online, March 19, 2005.
16. Le Shaoyan, “Japan, U.S. Decided to Make Joint War Plan,” Xinhua, May 12, 2005.
17. Wang Jianming, “Taiwan’s Role in ‘U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Strategic Coalition,’” World
Affairs (Beijing), no. 6 (2005): 58–59.
18. Wu Xinbo, “U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 3 (December 2000): 493–494.
19. Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr. “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing
Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 1 (Winter
2001): 7–9.
20. Kurt M. Campbell, “Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership,” The Washington
Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 130.
21. The Atlantic Council of the United States, The Mansfield Center for Pacific
Affairs, and The Research Institute for Peace and Security, “New Frontier for
U.S.-Japan Security Relations,” February 2002, p. 4, http://www.acus.org/docs/
22. INSS, “United States and Japan”; Balbina Y. Hwang, “A New Security Agenda
for the U.S.- Japan Alliance,” Backgrounder no. 1749, April 26, 2004, http://