

Mainland China's Taiwan Policy Adjustments

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As four generations of Chinese leadership have grappled with the Taiwan issue, the mainland has employed an evolving framework to deal with the ever-changing cross-Strait situation. This progression can be seen in changes from the “Nine Principles” advocated by Ye Jianying in 1981, to the “Eight Points” by Jiang Zeming in 1995, and then to the “Four Opinions” by President Hu Jintao in 2005. The Kuomintang (KMT)’s victory in the last presidential election and Ma Ying-jeou’s acceptance of the “1992 consensus” have created good conditions for the warming of cross-Strait relations. After many years of difficult wear and tear, facing the changing political and social situation on Taiwan Island, mainland China has started a wave of policy adjustments which provide a powerful dynamic for the improvement of cross-Strait relations.

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Starting from the five-point program issued in the Hu Jintao-Lien Chan 2005 press statement, to the new concept of “Common Destiny Community” (Mingyun Gongtongti) advocated in the report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Oct. 24, 2007, then to the 16-character guideline proposed by President Hu on April 29, 2008, we can see the emergence of new, more flexible thought in mainland policy towards Taiwan.¹ As a result, authorities and civilians on the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have witnessed increasing progress in cross-Strait relations. For example, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) resumed talks in Beijing last year after a nine-year suspension and weekend charter flights began, carrying the first mainland tourist group to Taiwan since 1949. From November 3 to 7, ARATS president Chen Yunlin paid a visit to the island at the invitation of SEF chairman Chiang Pin-kung and held the two organizations' first meeting in Taiwan. It also marked the first visit of an ARATS president to Taiwan. On December 15, direct shipping, air transport and postal services were formally launched according to the agreements signed in the Chen-Chiang meeting.²


In late December, encouraged by all of the progress achieved in the past several months, President Hu offered six proposals – each a logical extension of the former rhetoric – for future cross-Strait relations development and outlined a more rational and practical roadmap for China's Taiwan policy in the new era.³

NEW THINKING ON TAIWAN

Inferring from a series of recent policy declarations and speeches, the present framework of mainland China's cross-Strait policy could be summed up as following: take the “one China” principle as the policy basis, follow the “people first” idea as the guideline, and advocate peaceful unification through the path of “peaceful development.”

Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the “one China” principle has always been the core element of mainland China's cross-Strait policy. Since 1949, the acceptance or refusal of the “one China” principle has become the key variable in cross-Strait relations. The disputes between the two sides over the connotation of “one China” have developed in stages. At first, it was a legitimacy dispute between the CPC and KMT governments within “One China” framework over who was the legitimate authority in China. But neither side suggested that there was more than “one China” in the world. Based on this consensus, mainland China changed its policy from “liberating Taiwan by force,” to “liberating Taiwan by peaceful ways,” then to “unify by peaceful ways,” and finally to the thesis of “one country, two systems.” On the other hand, Taiwan began to allow the Taiwanese to visit and invest in the mainland. Cross-Strait interactions began to boom.

However, Lee Teng-hui's “two states remark” in 1999 changed it into a dispute between “one China” and “two Chinas.” The “one side, one country” assertion and a series of pro-independence policies put forward by the Chen Shuibian adminis-



Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou (right) greets visiting Chinese envoy and ARATS President Chen Yunlin during the Nov. 6, 2008 meeting in Taipei. Source: CNSImages.

tration changed it further into a dispute between “one China” and “one China, one Taiwan,” or a struggle between national unification and “legitimate independence.” From then on, the mutual trust and understanding weakened and political stalemate and the potential for military conflict followed.

The mainland’s prerequisite of the “one China” principle as the basis for any possible negotiations has never changed. As President Hu has reiterated, “Once the two sides reach a common understanding and accordant stance on the principle of one China, the foundation of political mutual trust will be laid and anything can be talked about between the two sides.”⁴ However, facing the changes of political reality in Taiwan, the mainland has refrained from repeatedly asserting the “one country, two systems” thesis, and has begun to gradually embrace the ambiguous definition of the “one China” principle, exemplified by the so called “1992 consensus.”⁵ On March 3, 2008, for the first time, Hu Jintao told US President George W. Bush that the mainland looked forward to restoring consultation and talks on the basis of the “1992 consensus,” which sees both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition.⁶ Although such an expression only appeared in the English version by Xinhua Agency, it reflects the mainland’s flexibility toward this basic principle. The Ma administration’s acceptance of the “1992 consensus” and its declaration that cross-Straits relations are “not State-to-State relations” provided the necessary basis for further cooperation.⁷ It seems now both sides have returned to the framework of “one China;” however, the two sides actually have a different focus in this so-called consensus. The mainland focuses first on “one China,” then “respective interpretation,” which is in accordance with its final goal of fulfilling national reuni-

fication. But Taiwan focuses first on “respective interpretation,” then “one China,” which hints towards the dangerous potential of “two Chinas.”

Since the KMT victory, the mainland has come to realize that no politician in Taiwan can dare to accept unification before the majority of the population embraces the idea. Undoubtedly, the mainland was relieved when the KMT won the election; however, Ma's declaration of the “Three No's” in his inauguration speech (no unification, no independence, and no use of force)⁸ and the severe protests towards Chen Yunlin's first visit to Taiwan have made the mainland recognize the power of main-

stream public opinion in an electoral political system. Mainland China must change from a traditional “government first” (or actually “KMT first”) mentality to a “people first” approach. “Placing hopes on the people in Taiwan” can no longer be just an empty political slogan. After a long learning process, the PRC leadership has realized it must do some practical things in order to foster empathy and faith among the Taiwanese population through mutual prosperity and economic integration. Without the support of the common people, unification will be a mission impossible.

Therefore it is not surprising that Hu Jintao's report to the 17th CPC National Congress included a new concept of “common destiny community” that recognizes that the 1.3 billion people on the mainland and the 23 million people in Taiwan “are of the same blood and share a common destiny.”⁹ This new concept not only adheres to the “people first” guideline, but implies a reorientation of the political status of the mainland and Taiwan: “one China” does not mean the “PRC's China,” but a win-win “common homeland” for the people across the Strait.

The mainland has tried to display its goodwill to all Taiwanese, regardless of their political affiliation. First, making full use of every quasi-official platform, CPC leaders received various high level Pan-Blue Coalition officials and tried to establish mutual trust and positive dealing with them. Secondly, the mainland has also publicly extended friendly gestures towards the Pan-Green camp, including prominent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) figures. This included inviting some DPP government leaders to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games.¹⁰ As President Hu has said, “If the DPP could change its ‘Taiwan independence’ stance, we would make a positive response to them.”¹¹ Third, cooperating closely with Taiwan's schedule, the mainland has also implemented a series of preferential policies that will serve and protect Taiwanese legitimate rights and interests, support their economic development, and practically benefit common Taiwanese students, farmers, workers and businessmen.¹²

From the early 1990s, the mainland's cross-Strait policy has witnessed several transitions. At first, the rapid growth of cross-Strait trade and people exchanges made the mainland optimistic about the prospect of unification, and Beijing thus

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placed “promoting unification” as the top priority. The strategy of this era can be summarized as “advocating unification plus economic and social interchanges.” However, this optimism was demolished by the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shuibian administrations, and the mainland policy shifted into “opposing independence plus economic and social interchanges.” Demoralized by the difficult cross-Strait situation in the past dozen years, the mainland realized that hasty unification is unrealistic. The most efficient way, maybe the only way, is to create a peaceful and stable situation and construct a new framework for peaceful development. This includes establishing a set of institutions covering security, political, economic and social affairs; promoting the “Three Links” of trade, transportation and mail services; forming special trade and investment agreements; and reaching a peace agreement through consultation to formally end the hostility. As President Hu put it, “With a firm grasp of the theme of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, we will sincerely work for the well-being of our compatriots on both sides of the Strait and for peace in the Taiwan Strait region.”¹³

Looking beyond the rhetoric, the policy of peaceful development also implies a profound policy consideration; although it is very hard for the mainland to admit publicly, it prefers to accept and maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. In other words, mainland policy in the foreseeable future will be “no independence, no immediate unification, but develop together peacefully.” Given the great gap between the two sides in political, economic and social dimensions, peaceful development has been regarded as the smoothest and most efficient path to final unification. It is also a necessity for the mainland, which is struggling to achieve full-scale modernization in an age of globalization.

DIFFICULTIES AHEAD

Following the progression of “easy issues before difficult issues” and “economy before politics” policies put forward by the mainland government, the two sides have made meaningful improvement in some less sensitive fields, such as financial cooperation, fulfillment of “Three Links” and the encouragement of mutual investment. However, a series of knotty problems still lie ahead, which will probably constrain the positive trends.

The status of the Republic of China is the biggest problem facing the mainland in the international arena. Domestically, it is very difficult for the mainland government and public opinion to admit and accept the legitimate existence of the ROC. Therefore, although the mainland’s support for the “1992 consensus” ambiguously hints at its acceptance of the ROC as an existing political entity, only unofficial and quasi-official channels can be accepted while official exchanges are still prohibited.¹⁴ That is why Beijing paid so much attention to the resumption of the nominally unofficial exchanges between ARATS and SEF, as well the “CPC-KMT Forum.” Of course, such a mutual understanding only can be applied when the mainland is dealing with bilateral issues involving Taiwan. Internationally, it is even harder for the mainland

to make such a concession since it would destroy the “one China” policy framework implemented over the past 60 years by presenting to the world an image of “two Chinas.” At present, the status of the ROC is directly connected with a lot of eminent problems lying before the two sides, such as Taiwan’s desire for greater international space. Unfortunately, the standpoints of the two sides about this issue are too far to find an overlap easily.

Satisfying Taiwan’s desire for a “dignified international profile” and greater international space is another hard job.¹⁵ Taiwan’s international aspirations can be classified into two categories: its bids to join international organizations and its maintenance of diplomatic relations with the two dozens countries that still recognize it. Taiwan wants the mainland to exhibit its wishes for friendly relations and “goodwill” by showing flexibility on these points; however, from the mainland’s point of view, there are two reasons to handle these issues with great care. First, although the Ma administration declared that it would not pursue independence, under the electoral system in Taiwan, no one knows when the KMT will lose the presidency again. Once that happens, the international space spared for Ma Ying-jeou may be used by pro-independence parties for possible legitimate independence. Second, even though the mainland will no longer actively encourage Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to switch their positions, what should it do when those countries want to change their diplomatic positions and establish formal diplomatic relations with an ever-rising mainland China?

As the most sensitive issue in international relations, mutual security confidence is the hardest to establish and easiest to destroy. In mainland China, there is always a deep concern about the possibility of Taiwan’s independence and its continuous military buildup. The United States’ support of Taiwan’s defense and massive US arms sales are seen as threatening and provocative acts to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, thus making policy changes even more difficult. For years, the mutual insecurity has led the two sides to adopt policies “based on fears.” For Beijing, it has built up its military to deter what it believes are Taiwan’s separatist schemes. On the other hand, Taipei intensified claims of sovereignty as a defense against looming domination by Beijing. As a result, each side’s moves intensified the other’s defense mechanisms.¹⁶ Therefore, although the United States and Taiwan have frequently asked the mainland to withdraw the short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) deployed in coastal provinces, and Ma Ying-jeou warned that the immediate removal of missiles is a precondition for any peace accord,¹⁷ the PLA has not been swayed. From the mainland’s perspective, it is the PRC’s sovereign right to deploy weapons on its own soil and the missiles are targeting “Taiwan independence,” not Taiwan’s people. So if Taiwan’s leaders do not want to declare independence, why should they be afraid of the missiles? Furthermore, since Taiwan continues to procure advanced weapons from the states, why should the mainland stop counteracting military preparations?

ADJUSTMENTS FOR BETTER PROSPECTS

The emergence of new strategic thought has brought some profound changes in the mainland's policy towards Taiwan. While trying to go beyond the traditional zero-sum mentality, the mainland is endeavoring to foster a more constructive and friendly cross-Strait atmosphere by exhibiting more flexibility and goodwill to Taiwan's authorities and civilians. As a result, the prospects for cross-Strait relations are more promising.

After 30 years of development, the economic/social interchanges, which are the easiest and least sensitive issues, function as reliable ballast for cross-Strait relations. Despite all the disagreements and wrangling, there is little opposition to the enhancement of economic and social interchanges between the two sides. As of October 2008, more than 7 million Taiwanese have visited the mainland, accounting for a total of 50.7 million trips. As of the end of October, the mainland had approved more than 77,000 projects of Taiwan investors and the value of trade between the two sides totaled US\$840 billion. In 2002, the mainland also became Taiwan's biggest export market. Both sides have witnessed great development in interchanges covering culture, education, technology and social spheres.¹⁸

Cross-Strait relations are now in a honeymoon period. The 16-character guideline for future cross-Strait relations President Hu proposed on April 29, 2008, which is very much in line with Taiwan's appeal,¹⁹ embodies the precondition, methods and goal of the mainland's cross-Strait policy. "Building mutual trust" is the necessary precondition for full scale cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, while "laying aside differences" and "seeking consensus while shelving differences" are the methods for trust building, and "creating a win-win situation" is the goal the mainland wants to achieve.

In the 4th Cross-Straits Economic, Trade and Cultural Forum held on Dec. 20, 2008, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, also extended the mainland's intention to expand and normalize cross-Strait economic cooperation and social exchanges. In accordance with President Hu's declaration, Jia called on the two sides to follow the principle of "people first" and start to discuss a cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanism as soon as possible in order to fulfill long-term "peaceful development." Echoing Taiwan's request for reaching a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement,²⁰ a sort of regularized economic accord, Jia announced that, "We have paid great attention to the proposal raised by the Taiwan side to discuss and sign an agreement on cross-Straits comprehensive economic cooperation, and we will take serious account of it." This is the first time the mainland has made such a positive response to this topic.²¹

Nowadays, the mainland leadership recognizes that institutionalized economic and social exchanges form the engine for stable and healthy cross-Strait relations. Many also believe that enhancement of economic/social exchanges, which would tie

the future of Taiwan closely with that of the mainland, can be helpful in reducing the political opposition and addressing security concern. That is why President Hu repeatedly called on both sides to increase communication and exchange in all circles, and solemnly promised that the mainland will actively respond to any constructive proposals from the island which will boost peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.²² Therefore, in the foreseeable future, the mainland and Taiwan can continue the present dynamic for exchanges and cooperation, which are in the interest of both sides.

Still, there are unresolved issues that will present challenges to further progress. The status of the ROC and the issue of its international space are two imminent problems that cannot be avoided. Since both of them are closely connected with state sovereignty, mainland leaders need political assurance that any compromises they make will somehow lead toward progress on the long-term goal of unification. Given that Ma Ying-jeou has said publicly that unification is not on his administration's agenda,²³ it is hard to imagine that the two sides can quickly and easily find a practical resolution in dealing with these issues. Both sides have to keep the old proverb of "haste makes waste" in their minds. Without a profound mutual trust, the earlier these issues will be aroused, and the easier the cross-Strait relations fall into a stalemate. Ambiguity is still the best choice.

In order to sustain the positive discourse between the two sides, the mainland has extended some olive branches to Taiwan which touched upon these sensitive issues. On Dec. 31, 2008, President Hu opened the opportunity to "start discussion about political relations under the special condition before reunification in a pragmatic manner."²⁴ That statement marks a milestone adjustment in 60 years of mainland policy, implying that the mainland would negotiate with its counterpart about the ROC's political status, an issue that has been intentionally ignored for dozens of years. In practice, the mainland is now trying to accommodate Taiwan's concerns about "sovereignty issues." For example, given Taiwan's strong opposition towards the precondition of "one China," which they suspect hints to a lesser stature of Taiwan's "sovereignty," the mainland is becoming more self-constrained. After President Hu's meeting with Taiwan's "Vice President-elect," Vincent Siew, in April 2008, the PRC Commerce Ministry instantly reported that both sides looked forward to resuming dialogue "under the one China principle." When Siew protested this inaccurate report, the Commerce Ministry retracted it and reissued the report without the reference. From this case, we can see Beijing's flexibility to suspend sensitive disputes and its determination to establish positive dealing with Taiwan administration.²⁵

Concerning the so-called "international space" issue, the mainland has expressed several times that it has noticed the strong feeling of the Taiwanese for a "more dignified international profile." For the diplomatic relations aspect, the mainland realized that it is not an opportune moment to continue to encourage Taipei's remaining diplomatic allies to switch relations, which would only foster hostility on

the island. For instance, Beijing has suspended the request from Paraguay, one of Taiwan's allies, for establishing formal diplomatic relations. The mainland, echoing Ma's call for a "diplomatic truce," is trying to adopt a more flexible and self-contained foreign policy. The appointment of Wang Yi, former deputy foreign minister, as the director of Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) also can be seen as a signal of the mainland's endeavor to enhance the interdepartmental cooperation and coordination between the Foreign Ministry and TAO.

Compared with the more reversible arrangement for a "diplomatic truce," the participation of Taiwan in international organizations of highly politically symbolic meaning is a much more difficult issue and needs to be handled with prudence. However, from the mainland's declaration, we can find some very delicate policy adjustments which can be divided into two stages.

First, allow Taiwan to "take larger part in international activities." As early as Hu-Lien's 2005 press statement, the proposed five-point program indicated that the CPC acknowledged and understood the importance of international space to Taiwan. On April 29, 2008, Hu declared that larger "international activities" for Taiwan could be discussed. In November, Lien Chan, the former "Vice President" of Taiwan, was chosen as Ma's special representative to attend the APEC unofficial summit with the mainland's acquiescence. One month later, the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office reiterated that the mainland would like to "create conditions" and "find a resolution" for "Taiwan's participation in the WHO's relevant activities."²⁶

Second, allow Taiwan to participate in "international organizations." For years, Taiwan's applications for membership in international organizations, such as the UN and World Health Organization, always aroused severe turbulence across the Strait. The primary reason for the mainland's opposition originated from its worry that Taiwan would take advantage of the compromises for the purpose of implementing some form of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" in the international arena. Another important reason is that such a concession could be "irreversible," as it would be very difficult to deprive Taiwan of membership once it was conferred. Therefore, it is surprising to hear President Hu state that "the mainland is willing to discuss with Taiwan proper and reasonable arrangements for Taiwan's participation in international organizations," with the prerequisite that it "does not create a scenario of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan.'" This means that the Taiwan administration must constrain itself, publicly or secretly, from provoking the mainland by applying for a membership with the name of "ROC" or "Taiwan."²⁷ Following this brand-new guideline, if Taiwan can adopt a practical policy this year and bid with the name of "Chinese Taipei" for observer status in the World Health Assembly (WHA), instead of the WHO or other international organizations only for sovereign countries, it is very likely to achieve a historic breakthrough in cross-Strait relations.

The final and most difficult barrier to change is lack of trust on security issues. After almost 40 years of military confrontation, the two sides have witnessed ever-

growing civilian exchanges since November 1987. However, the security trust remains fragile mainly because of two interconnected dynamics: Taipei's persistent procurement of advanced weapons from the United States for defense; and Beijing's consistent refusal to give up the use of force as the last resort to unification. The mainland's increasing deployment of short-range ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait after Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States has gradually become a focus of attention and target of criticism from both Taiwan and the United States. On the other hand, the provocative policies of the Taiwanese administrations and the staunch US support of arms sales strengthened Beijing's determination of military deterrence. All of these entangled interactions have caused in-depth enmity between the two sides.²⁸

The security dilemma has become a great barrier for the development of cross-Strait relations that both sides are trying to overcome. For example, after President Hu proposed to "end hostility and reach peaceful agreements under the one China principle" in his report to the 17th National Congress of CPC, Ma also responded that consultation would be held on a peace accord. But Ma has said that such a talk will not be started while more than 1,000 missiles aimed at Taiwan remain in place.²⁹ Still, it is progress for both sides to raise the issue of peace agreement negotiation, which requires a fundamental security mutual trust be established first.

In his December 31 speech, President Hu called on the two sides to step up contacts and exchanges on military issues "at an appropriate time" and talk about a military security mechanism of mutual trust, in a bid to stabilize cross-Strait relations and ease concerns about military security.³⁰ This is the first time the mainland has sent out a clear message on the issue. In order to break through the security dilemma, it seems the mainland is mulling taking the first step. Sources from Hong Kong and Taipei both indicate that the mainland is considering the possible redeployment of missiles and planning to gradually decrease the number of SRBMs targeting Taiwan.³¹ However, it is believed that the decision is hard to make and consensus hard to reach, especially against the background of contrary gestures from Taiwan. For example, Ma has repeated several times that he will invest in Taiwan's defense and continue with reasonable arms procurements. In May 2008, Chen Chao-min, Taipei's new defense minister, urged the United States to sell F-16C/D fighters and then declared publicly that Taiwan would continue to develop Hsiung Feng II E surface-to-surface cruise missiles, which can attack Shanghai and Hong Kong.³² Even in response to the news about the possible redeployment of missiles, the spokeswoman of Taiwan's "Ministry of National Defense" said that removing missiles would be purely symbolic, therefore Taiwan would not let down its guard or cut back on its defense.³³ At the same time, after the Bush administration approved an arms package worth as much

as US\$6.4 billion last October, Taiwan has continued to ask for more advanced weapons. If President Obama agrees to sell Taiwan sensitive weapons, such as submarines and high-tech aircraft, it will strengthen the hawkish voices on the mainland, and thus make it harder for PRC leaders to adjust cross-Strait policy further. The coming arms sale may become a brake for the growth of mutual military trust. However, so long as the mainland can stick to the “people first” guideline and follow the path of peaceful development, all of the thorny challenges could be resolved by the mutual effort and further policy adjustments from both sides across the Strait. ☹

NOTES

¹ The 16-characters guideline for cross-Strait relations is the two sides should “build mutual trust, lay aside differences, seek consensus while shelving differences, and create a win-win situation”.

² “Backgrounder: Milestones in cross-Straits relations over 30 years,” 31 Dec. 2008, *Xinhua*, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/31/content_10587408.htm

³ “President Hu offers six proposals for peaceful development of cross-Strait relationship,” *Xinhua*, Dec.31, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/31/content_10585635.htm

⁴ “President Hu offers six proposals.”

⁵ The “1992 consensus” is that “both sides of the (Taiwan) Strait adhere to the ‘one China’ principle” and orally explain the principle respectively, that is, “One China, Respective Interpretation”. See: “Backgrounder: 1992 Consensus on one-China principle,” *Xinhua*, Oct. 13, 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-03/04/content_2650049.htm

⁶ “Chinese, US Presidents Hold Telephone Talks on Taiwan, Tibet,” *Xinhua*, Mar. 26. 2008.

⁷ Mainland Affairs Office Press Release, “President Ma Received the Interview of Organización Editorial Mexicana Chairman Mr. Mario Vázquez Raña,” Sept. 3, 2008, <http://www.mac.gov.tw/gb/index1.htm>

⁸ Ma Ying-jeou, “Taiwan’s Renaissance,” *The China Post*, May 21, 2008, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national%20news/2008/05/21/157332/Full-text.htm>

⁹ Hu Jintao, “The 17th Party Congress Political Report,” *Xinhua*, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.china.com.cn/17da/2007-10/24/content_9119449.htm

¹⁰ Unfortunately, no DPP leaders came to the ceremony because of their political and ideological stands. Such a visit will make them be criticized as “pro-China” and put them in a very embarrassing situation in domestic politics.

¹¹ “President Hu offers six proposals.”

¹² “Wang Yi Declared 10 Preferential Policy towards Taiwan Facing International Financial Crisis,” http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/gzyw/gzyw1.asp?gzyw_m_id=1806

¹³ “The 17th Party Congress Political Report.”

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Huang Qinglong, “Richard Bush’s View: Economic Exchanges Are Not Enough, Real Problems Ahead,” *China Times*, Dec. 8, 2008.

¹⁶ Richard Bush, “The Balancing Act Across the Strait,” *PacNet*, No. 34, June 20, 2008, p.1.

¹⁷ Mainland Affairs Council Press Release, “President Ma Received the Interview of Yomiuri,” June 4, 2008, <http://www.mac.gov.tw/gb/index1.htm>

¹⁸ Wang Yi, “Prospects of Peaceful Development in Cross-Strait Relations,” Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/gzyw/gzyw1.asp?gzyw_m_id=1834

¹⁹ In Boao Forum 2008, Vincent Siew, representing Ma Ying-jeou, also advocated a 16-character guideline for cross-Strait relations, that is, “look reality in the face, open a new epoch, lay down difference, strive for win-win situation.

²⁰ CECA is a kind of economic cooperation model situated between the state-to-state Free Trade Agreement and the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement reached by mainland China with Hong Kong and Macau.

²¹ “Mainland, Taiwan Hold Economic, Cultural Forum,” *Xinhua*, Dec.20, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/20/content_10529915.htm

²² “President Hu offers six proposals.”

²³ Ma’s interview by Associated Press on May 15, 2008. Quoted “The Balancing Act Across the Strait.”

²⁴ “President Hu offers six proposals.”

²⁵ David Brown, “Dialogue Resumes in Relaxed Atmosphere,” *Comparative Connections*, July, 2008, p.1.

²⁶ “Taiwan Affairs Office: Find a Resolution for Taiwan’s Participation of WHO through Cross-Strait Negotiation,” Dec. 17, 2008, See: http://www.chinataiwan.org/wxzl/gtbwx/200812/t20081218_800397.htm

²⁷ “The 17th Party Congress Political Report.”

²⁸ Bonnie Glaser and Brad Glosserman, “Promoting Confidence Building Across the Taiwan Strait,” See: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080910_glaser_promotingconfidence_web.pdf

²⁹ Bonnie Glaser, “If Not Now, When? Will China Seize the Opportunity to Improve Cross-Strait Relations?” *PacNet*, No. 24, p.2.

³⁰ “President Hu offers six proposals.”

³¹ “Taipei Said Mainland May Decrease Missiles Targeting Taiwan,” *Cankao Xiaoxi*, Jan.5, 2009, p.8.

³² On Sept.1, 2008, Taipei changed its position by declaring it will “stop to develop” the Hsiung Feng missile, but will continue the production.

³³ Rich Chang, “MND unmoved by PRC Missile Report,” Jan 04, 2009, *Taipei Times*, p.1.